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Introduction  
On Tuesday 23 April 2013 at 1:07 PM, a memorable message from the twitter account of the 
well-known news agency The Associated Press (AP) was sent. The message stated: 
“Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured”, and was sent 
to nearly 2 million followers. A minute later, the index of the Dow Jones stock market in New 
York began dropping heavily. In a few minutes the stock exchange lost 150 points, erasing 
$136 billion of the market value, and also other indexes reacted similarly. However, it soon 
appeared that there were no explosions in the White House and that president Obama was not 
injured. A message from another twitter account belonging to the AP indeed confirmed that 
“the tweet about an attack on the White House was false”.1  
 It appeared that the AP’s twitter account was hijacked and that the false news message 
was posted by the mysterious hacking group Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). About an hour 
after the false tweet, the SEA claimed responsibility for the cyber attack. On their twitter 
account, the SEA posted a screenshot, showing user control over the AP’s twitter account 
with the just sent false message. The Syrian Electronic Army is a group of unknown 
individuals with unknown motives, but they are known for their brutal cyber attacks. While 
not officially associated with the Assad regime, the group supports the Assad cause in the 
Syrian civil war by attacking opposition websites. However, it remains unclear why the 
hacking group targeted the AP.
2
  
 Just like the AP, the SEA has attacked many other websites and social media accounts 
of big news agencies and other media. In the same period of the AP hack, spring and summer 
2013, the SEA has attacked the social media accounts of, among others, Reuters,
3
 the BBC,
4
 
the Guardian,
5
 the Telegraph,
6
 Sky News,
7
 the New York Post,
8
 the New York Times
9
 and 
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many more. It is striking that foreign media seem to be the major target of the SEA. 
Especially during the spring and summer of 2013, at least every week a big news organization 
got targeted by the mysterious hacking group. Because of the unrest that the cyber attacks 
caused in society and because of the potential harm on the stock markets, the FBI has 
classified the Syrian Electronic Army as a terrorist organization and has placed them on their 
most wanted list in September 2013.
10
 
 The wave of cyber attacks by the SEA on Western media seems to be related to the 
war in Syria. The war in Syria, which began as a small civil war in 2011, after four months of 
peaceful civil strife, has turned into a very complicated regional conflict, in which multiple 
national, international and transnational actors are involved and very different and clashing 
interests are at stake. Moreover, in this digital age, the Syrian war is one of the first wars in 
which a new dimension has emerged. Not only is the war fought in the conventional 
dimensions: land, sea and air, but the war is also fought in cyberspace. Hacking activities, 
cyber attacks, or more general cyber tactics, are newly applied in the Syrian war.  
 But there is something strange about the wave of cyber attacks on Western media; the 
attacks could potentially be much more harmful than they actually were. The compromised 
social media accounts were easily recovered and the false messages easily removed. The only 
real damage that the wave of cyber attacks caused was the dip in the stock exchange after the 
AP hack. If the hacks on the social media accounts were more strategically used, the SEA 
could have caused much more damage. This is also what Ira Winkler, a security professional, 
at the RSA Conference said. In a presentation about SEA’s wave of cyber attacks, Winkler 
said that the SEA performed effective, but stupid attacks. They only defaced websites and 
Twitter accounts, but they could have access to much more information. Winkler added: 
“these people could be doing a lot more damage if they ever got a clou”.11  
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 However, I would not immediately assume that the wave of cyber attacks on Western 
news organizations was an act of stupidity. The cyber attacks were well prepared, took a lot of 
efforts and showed a certain degree of professionalism. The SEA targeted more than fifty 
different news organizations and during the peak of its cyber operations in the summer of 
2013, the SEA carried out at least two attacks a week. From a Western perspective, the wave 
of cyber attacks was not very harmful and might therefore seem stupid, but we do not know 
the real motives behind the attacks and how they are connected to the war in Syria. The 
behaviour of the SEA raises thus a lot of questions: why did they attack Western media at 
such a large scale? And why did they not do the harm that they could have done? To have a 
better understanding of the cyber operations of the SEA, I will in this paper analyze how the 
cyber attacks of the SEA were related to the Syrian civil war.  
 
The ‘cyber war’-debate 
Although cyber tactics in warfare are a new phenomenon, there is written relatively a lot 
about it. This is mainly elicited by an article published by the RAND Corporation in 1993, 
warning that “cyberwar is coming.”12 ‘Cyber war’ is presented as a new form of war between 
states with devastating effects. Because societies rely more and more on digital infrastructure, 
they also become more vulnerable to cyber attacks, which could heavily disrupt society. 
Doomsday scenarios were predicted of cyber attacks affecting air traffic control systems, 
leaving airplanes in the air without communication; cyber attacks infecting financial 
institutions, erasing important financial information; and cyber attacks on nuclear plants, 
causing meltdown and contamination.
13
 However, 25 years later, these devastating predictions 
did not have come true. Politically motivated cyber attacks seem to behave differently; ‘cyber 
war’ has therefore become a contested term in the academic literature.  
 Most of the literature in the field of International Relations (IR) about cyber tactics in 
warfare, or ‘cyber war’, is rather hypothetical and is about theorizing the phenomenon. With 
no or almost no empirical data, research on cyber tactics focuses on defining the phenomenon, 
identifying moral implications and placing the phenomenon in a theoretical framework. The 
major debate is about the likelihood of the occurrence of ‘cyber war’ and how it should be 
specified in academic research. There is no clear and unambiguous definition of ‘cyber war’, 
which makes the debate rather chaotic. The academic debate about ‘cyber war’ can roughly be 
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divided into two camps: on the one hand those who argue that ‘cyber war’ could exist and on 
the other hand those who say that it cannot.  
 The scholars, who argue that ‘cyber war’ could hypothetically exist, claim that the 
phenomenon is a new form of war. For example, Allhoff, Henschke and Strawser argue that 
the outcome of politically motivated cyber attacks is damage, either digital or physical; cyber 
attacks could therefore be acts of war. They define ‘cyber war’ as: “an actual, intentional, and 
widespread armed conflict between political communities, conducted by means of, or targeted 
at, computing and communications technology (...)”.14 Ryan Jenkins, in addition, states that 
‘cyber war’ would be a morally ideal war - a war in which no civilians get harmed. Cyber 
weapons could be designed to discriminate; in this way a target could be specified precisely 
and no civilians would get affected. Moreover, cyber weapons are non-violent; a war could 
thus be fought in non-violent, moral ways.
15
  
 Other scholars argue that ‘cyber war’ is not a form of war because it does not fit in 
existing definitions of war. One of them is Thomas Rid; he argues that ‘cyber war’ does not 
meet the essential elements of war of the concept of Clausewitz. According to the famous 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, war consists of three basic elements: a violent element 
(an act of war is always potentially lethal), an instrumental element (an act of war has always 
a means and an end), and a political element (an act of war must serve a political cause). 
While, according to Rid, cyber attacks could theoretically meet these criteria, in reality it 
never happened. Moreover, it is unlikely to happen because cyber attacks could already be 
effective without being violent or without being instrumental. Cyber attacks should therefore 
be regarded as something else than acts of war.
16
  
 Moreover, scholars also argue that cyber attacks do not have a significant real world 
impact and can therefore not be considered war. Erik Gartzke, a scholar who would agree 
with Thomas Rid, argues that cyber attacks have only a short-term, temporary impact on 
targets. The damage of a cyber attack is easy to restore with relatively little investment, and 
does not impact human lives. For an attack to be effective, according to Gartzke, it must 
inflict unacceptable harm – something that a cyber attack cannot achieve. Since cyber attacks 
do not pose unacceptable harm (e.g. loss of lives), they cannot alter the balance of power, 
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wherefore they would not matter politically. Gartzke discards ‘cyber war’ as “an inferior 
substitute to terrestrial force in performing the functions of coercion or conquest.”17 Cyber 
attacks are too weak to challenge the balance of power, and they are therefore different from 
acts of war. 
 Besides the lack of a violent component and the inability to pose a real world impact, 
other studies have shown that applying war theories and war strategies to ‘cyber war’ appears 
to be problematic. One issue is the problem of attribution. Most cyber attacks are performed 
in anonymity and lack therefore attribution. Without knowing who initiated the attack, it is 
not possible to retaliate; most politically motivated cyber attacks tend therefore to be 
ignored.
18
 Another issue is the ratio between defence and offence. According to Clausewitz, a 
good defence in conventional warfare is more beneficial because a good offence would 
require more resources. However, in cyberspace a good defence requires awareness of all IT 
vulnerabilities, while an effective cyber offence only needs one to exploit. In contrast to 
conventional warfare, in cyberspace a good offence appears more advantageous.
19
 Also the 
nature of cyber weapons is different than the nature of conventional weapons. Just like other 
computer technologies, cyber weapons are quickly outdated and are therefore often only 
usable once.
20
 A final issue is the nature of cyberspace itself. Unlike other domains in 
warfare, like land, sea, and air, it is not possible to have territorial control in cyberspace.
21
 
These issues indicate that ‘cyber war’ behaves differently than conventional warfare and that 
it needs to be treated differently.  
 Therefore, I agree with the scholars who argue that ‘cyber war’ is not a new form of 
war. Rid, Gartzke, and others have shown that ‘cyber war’ differs too much from what 
generally is considered war. However, I recognize that new technologies, such as cyber 
weapons, can play a significant role in modern warfare; they might produce new possibilities 
and advantages, and even might change how wars are fought. This is also what Lucas Kello 
argues; although cyber tactics will not replace conventional warfare, they expand the 
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possibilities of traditional weapons and will be integrated into modern warfare in the future.
22
 
But because cyber attacks do not have the same destructing impact that acts of war have, the 
term ‘cyber war’ is misleading. I therefore tend to avoid the term ‘cyber war’. Instead, I prefer 
to use the term ‘cyber tactics’ when I refer to the use of cyber means in conflict situations.  
  
Alternative theories about cyber tactics 
Because cyber attacks cannot straightaway be regarded as war, the question arises from what 
theoretical framework cyber tactics in warfare should be approached instead. Several scholars 
have provided new suggestions for this theoretical question. In this section I will discuss the 
most relevant theoretical approaches.  
 Thomas Rid has suggested that cyber attacks are not acts of war, but means of war. 
While Rid states that cyber attacks lack the elements of acts of war, he recognizes that cyber 
attacks play a role in modern warfare. Cyber attacks could support and strengthen 
conventional attacks: they could be considered means of war. To illustrate this, Rid gives the 
example of ‘Operation Orchard’. In 2007 Israel carried out a bombing raid against a nuclear 
reactor in Dayr el-Zor in Syria. Before entering Syrian airspace, Israel hacked the Syrian air 
defence system, leaving the Syrians unable to detect the Israeli Air Force invading the Syrian 
airspace. The combination of the bombing attack with the cyber tactic made this raid 
exceptionally effective.
23
  
 However, the term ‘means of war’ indicates that a cyber attack always accompanies an 
act of war, or at least is performed in a violent warlike situation, which does not need to be the 
case. In his article, Rid gives the example of the sophisticated Stuxnet virus. Stuxnet was a 
computer worm that has infected thousands of computers from all over the world between 
2008 and 2011. But while thousands of computers were infected, the virus only affected the 
industrial control systems of the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in Iran. The worm 
corrupted the communication between the computer drivers and the motors of the centrifuges 
by constantly changing output frequencies, causing physical damage to the centrifuges and 
causing a delay in Iran’s nuclear program. Because of the precision of Stuxnet and because of 
the involved political interests, it is thought that Stuxnet is created by a ‘cyber superpower’, 
assumingly the US and/or Israel.
24
 Stuxnet, often taken as an example of ‘cyber war’, was a 
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‘stand-alone’ operation. It did not accompany a violent attack, nor did it happen in a violent 
warlike situation. Because of the complete absence of war, the term ‘means of war’ is in my 
opinion not completely accurate either.  
 Another scholar, Nikola Schmidt, argues that cyber tactics should be studied as 
components of a hybrid war. A hybrid war is a new form of war with a hybrid shape. Wars no 
longer tend to be the large-scale wars between states, but become more dynamic and thereby 
more effective. Hybrid wars are generally quite chaotic and its development hard to predict; 
they are fought in several battle spaces at the same time, fought by several means, have no 
central command or control, and the different actions do not need to be related to each other. 
A hybrid war is also often an asymmetric conflict with different amounts of power, a wide 
variety of components, and a blurred distinction between state and non-state actors.
25
 Given 
the capricious and unconventional character of a hybrid war, cyber tactics could flawless fit 
into this kind of war. However, the hybrid war theory does not explain why and how cyber 
tactics are used. 
 Seumas Miller adds that cyber tactics function as covert political actions. Covert 
political actions are like ‘dirty hands politics’; they are illegal and immoral, but are justified 
for achieving a greater good. Customarily, covert political actions include the assassination of 
political leaders, financing coup d’états, and spreading disinformation and propaganda. They 
are meant to harm the enemy without invoking war. Miller argues that cyber attacks act the 
same: they are illegal, but morally justified to weaken the enemy. This is especially beneficial 
if the risk for a war is too high, for example when the enemy is more powerful or when a 
nuclear war could be triggered. This could explain the ongoing cyber conflicts between big 
powers like the US, Russia and China, but also the cyber conflicts between regional rivals like 
Israel and Iran. Cyber tactics as covert political actions function, according to Miller, as a 
mechanism to prevent escalation of a political conflict.
26
  
 In my opinion, the explanation of covert political actions could explain the 
phenomenon of politically motivated cyber attacks very well. States tend to exploit the 
problem of attribution – they make ample use of the possibility to perform cyber actions 
secretly and anonymously.
27
 Because cyber tactics can be used secretly and anonymously and 
have relevant political potential, they are especially appropriate for covert political actions. 
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However, just like all other theoretical explanations about cyber tactics, Miller’s theory is not 
based on a solid ground of empirical data. Miller has based his argument only on a couple of 
examples, among others the Stuxnet virus and the series of cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007.
28
 
While cyber tactics as covert political actions seem plausible, the theory needs to be based on 
more empirical data.  
 
Non-state cyber actors 
As already said, most of the academic research on cyber tactics is rather hypothetical and 
speculative. But to have a better understanding of the use of cyber tactics, research has to be 
based on analyzed empirical data. This is also what Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness 
must have thought. To have a better understanding of the use of cyber tactics, they have 
analyzed all publicly known state-led cyber operations in the period between 2001 and 2011. 
They have gathered the data from relevant news articles and have selected them on explicit 
and evident attribution.
29
 From their analysis, some remarkable and interesting conclusions 
can be drawn.  
 Valeriano and Maness have found that cyber conflicts tend to be regional. Despite the 
global character of cyberspace and the ease to reach the other site of the world, a majority of 
the politically motivated cyber attacks are targeted at regional enemies. This is credible 
because political conflicts tend to be regional as well; it is less common that states from 
different parts of the world are entangled in a conflict. But there is one exception: big powers 
with political, military, and economic interests in all parts of the world are often engaged in 
global cyber conflicts. A good example is the US; the US uses cyber tactics globally and the 
US is targeted by actors from all over the world. Valeriano and Maness conclude that minor 
powers use their cyber tactics at the regional level and big powers at a global level.
30
  
 Another remarkable conclusion that Valeriano and Maness drew is that states hardly 
use cyber tactics, and when they do the impact of these tactics is minimal. Even states that are 
active rivals and have regularly military disputes with each other, are reluctant in using cyber 
tactics. Moreover, the tactics that are used are most often low-tech, like simple DDoS attacks. 
Low-tech cyber attacks are easy and cheap to use but they do not cause severe damage. More 
advanced and expensive techniques – techniques that require more skills, more preparation, 
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and sometimes even intelligence – could do much more damage, but they are very rare. While 
cyber tactics pose a broad range of possibilities, states are thus not eager to use them.
31
  
 Valeriano and Maness explain their surprising findings with a theory of restraint. If a 
cyber attack causes too much damage, the targeted state will not react positively. Even 
without attribution but with suspicion, a targeted state will try to retaliate with a similar cyber 
attack or even worse. If targeted states respond negatively, cyber tactics do not trigger a 
positive change of behaviour and are thus ineffective. States keep their cyber operations low-
levelled not to risk escalation of the conflict. Valeriano and Maness’ results show indeed that 
low-levelled cyber operations do not affect international relations between states. States are 
thus reluctant to use cyber tactics because they fear escalation of the conflict.
32
   
 The findings of Valeriano and Maness resemble the theory of Miller about covert 
political actions. While Valeriano and Maness do not cite Miller’s article, they have similar 
ideas on how cyber tactics work in the international system. Cyber tactics are meant to harm 
the enemy, but not to change the international relations. Since there is a risk that the secretly 
and anonymously performed cyber operations can leak out, there is also a risk of escalation of 
the conflict. States do not want to take that risk and tend therefore to keep the cyber 
operations low-levelled. This is similar to Miller’s idea about covert political actions: covert 
political actions are also meant to weaken the enemy without the risk of triggering a war.  
 However, while the conclusions of Valeriano and Maness are clarifying, they do not 
explain the many politically motivated cyber attacks that occur. In their research they have 
only selected the cyber attacks that were performed by state actors; they have excluded the 
cyber attacks from unknown sources or from non-state actors, such as the Syrian Electronic 
Army. Valeriano and Maness argue that the connections between state and non-state actors 
are unsure and that the political agenda of non-state actors is unclear. Non-state actors are 
therefore hard to research and the results will be unreliable.
33
 They will have their own 
interests based on political, social or religious causes, often in opposition to the government 
policies. Moreover, the impact of non-state actors will be negligible because they do not have 
the same expertise – like funding, skills and intelligence – as states have. Their cyber attacks 
are therefore often discarded as cyber terrorism.
34
 But, since states hardly use cyber tactics 
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and since politically motivated cyber attacks are fairly common, the role of non-state actors 
should be more important.  
 According to Adam Segal, this can be explained because states often outsource their 
cyber activities. States are constantly engaged in cyber conflicts, but this is not always 
traceable. States produce a smokescreen by using third party hackers to conceal their cyber 
activities. For example, the US often hires individual hackers to carry out cyber attacks, and 
Russia relies on cyber criminals, patriotic hackers and other proxies to perform cyber 
operations. Outsourcing cyber activities is tactical because it even more exploits the problem 
of attribution. Because there is no official link between the state and the third party hacker, 
states can easily accuse the criminal or hacktivist organization and can deny any complicity.
35
 
Outsourcing cyber activities to third party hackers is less risky and therefore more attractive.  
 While non-state cyber actors have always been marginalized in the research on cyber 
tactics, this literature review suggests that their role must be more significant. It is always 
assumed, especially from a realist point of view, that non-state cyber actors do not have 
enough expertise to cause severe and significant damage. However, as an extension of state 
actors, non-state cyber actors seem to play a more significant role in the international field. 
But there is no research done to explain this role. It remains unclear what the role of non-state 
cyber actors is, and how significant the impact of their cyber attacks can be. Understanding 
the role of the non-state cyber actors is important for a good understanding of the use of cyber 
tactics in the international relations.  
 
The Area Studies perspective 
The role of the Syrian Electronic Army is a good and interesting case study to investigate the 
role of non-state cyber actors in cyber conflicts. The SEA is especially interesting because its 
behaviour raises a lot of questions. Why did they attack so many Western media and why did 
they not cause the damage that they were able to? Since it is commonly known that cyber 
attacks, just like covert political actions, are more effective when performed secretly and 
anonymously,
36
 why did the SEA claim responsibility for their attacks? Moreover, the SEA is 
especially a good case study because they are operating in a warlike situation and they are 
openly supporting the regime of Assad; there is thus a link between the SEA and an important 
state actor in the Syrian war. While the SEA could theoretically be defined as a ‘hacktivist’ 
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movement, a non-state cyber actor attacking for political or ideological purposes,
37
 I would 
not treat the SEA as a hacktivist movement. Hacktivist movements usually have capricious 
and unreliable agendas which easily change, while the SEA has aligned itself to the Syrian 
government and will therefore behave more predictable.  
 Furthermore, the Syrian civil war is very relevant because the war is known for the 
important role that internet has. The Syrian civil war has grown out of the Arab Revolutions, 
or Arab Spring, in Syria in 2011. While internet and social media did not cause the revolution 
in Syria, they did contribute to the uprising by fuelling and facilitating it.
38
 During the 
revolutions and the war, millions of pictures, videos, tweets and blogs have been published on 
the internet. Just because of the important role that internet and social media play in the war, 
the Syrian civil war is known as the “most documented war ever.”39 Also about the cyber 
operations of the SEA has been published a lot on the internet. The abundance of primary 
sources related to the war makes research a lot easier.  
 In this research I will analyze the cyber attacks of the Syrian Electronic Army to 
understand how they were related to the Syrian war. The cyber attacks of the SEA seemed 
illogical and stupid, but they were frequently and carefully carried out with a certain degree of 
professionalism. To have a better understanding of the strategy behind these cyber attacks, I 
will address the following research question: how were the cyber attacks of the SEA related to 
the Syrian civil war? In this paper I will argue that the SEA carried out their cyber attacks, not 
the harm the West, but rather to influence and control the Syrian opposition with the purpose 
to weaken them.  
By analyzing the cyber attacks of the SEA, I will focus on the context in which the 
SEA operated. The SEA has been most active during a four-year period between 2012 and 
2015; in this time they have carried out the most and the most notable cyber attacks. 
However, by investigating their cyber activities I will not only analyze their prominent 
attacks, but their complete range of cyber operations. The SEA’s most notable attacks, the 
wave of cyber attacks on Western media, are only significant from a Western perspective. But 
one has to keep in mind that the SEA is operating in different circumstances, which has to be 
approached from a different perspective. The SEA operates in a violent conflict in which they 
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fight against the Syrian opposition. Analyzing the strategy of the SEA with this context in 
mind will result in a better explainable conclusion. 
 Because the Middle Eastern background of the SEA needs to be taken into account, I 
will approach my research from an Area Studies perspective. Area Studies is the study of non-
Western regions, which includes knowledge of culture, history, religion and language. In 
recent years, Area Studies knowledge is revalued in the field of International Relations. 
Amitav Acharya, for example, argues that the discipline of IR is too Western-oriented. 
Consequently, applying IR theories to non-Western regions yields wry results; applying Area 
Studies knowledge in researching a non-Western region is therefore necessary.
40
 Moreover, 
none of the studies on cyber tactics in warfare have taken an Area Studies or a historical 
framework into account. This is a pity, because such a framework could be very explanatory 
in the use of cyber tactics in specific situations.  
 To understand the specific situations in which the SEA operates, one needs a better 
overview of what is happening in cyberspace related to the Syrian war. Since internet plays 
such an important role in the daily lives of people and also in the war, the war has developed a 
cyber dimension in which a lot is going on. It is likely that the SEA is not merely operating 
from their own political agenda, but that the cyber operations are also a reaction to events that 
happened in either the real world or in cyberspace. Moreover, the SEA is not the only cyber 
actor; there are lots of other cyber actors participating in the Syrian war. The cyber attacks of 
the SEA might also be acts of rivalry with these other cyber actors; the SEA’s place in this 
network needs to be determined.  
 To determine SEA’s place in cyberspace, I will make a network analysis of all cyber 
actors participating in the Syrian war. To do this, I will gather all cyber attacks related to the 
Syrian war from news articles and with this data I will make a network analysis. From this 
analysis I can determine the main cyber actors participating in the war and the main targets 
that are attacked. Such a network analysis will give a broader overview of what is happening 
in cyberspace and in what circumstances the SEA is operating. Moreover, broader lines can 
be drawn from such an analysis: do the real world rivalries appear on the internet as well? 
Knowing the main cyber actors with whom the SEA might interact, can explain a lot about the 
motives of the SEA.  
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 Furthermore, I will analyze the messages that the SEA has left on defaced websites 
and on hijacked social media accounts, to understand why these cyber attacks were carried 
out. Because of the limited scope of this research, I will focus on two main categories of 
targets: cyber attacks on media and cyber attacks on communication services. My network 
analysis in chapter 1 will show that the SEA especially focused on these two categories. Also, 
I will place these messages in the context of the course of the war to analyze the development 
of the SEA’s strategy. To do this, I have divided the war into four phases. In these four 
phases, the Syrian war knows different developments which have had their influence on 
cyberspace.  
 The first chapter of this paper is about the network analysis of the cyber actors in the 
Syrian civil war. In this chapter I will show which cyber actors were active in each phase of 
the war and what targets were mainly attacked. In this chapter I will give an answer to the 
subquestion who were the main cyber actors in the Syrian civil war and what were their main 
targets? Furthermore, I will indicate some patterns in cyberspace on which I will base the 
analysis of the cyber attacks in the next chapters.  
In the second chapter I will elaborate on the emergence of the SEA. I will answer the 
following subquestion: what is the SEA and how has it emerged? I will explain that the SEA 
emerged as a reaction to cyber attacks from hacktivist movements targeting the Syrian 
government. Furthermore, I will place its emergence in the context of internet use and internet 
censorship in Syria.  
In the third chapter I will explain why the SEA targeted communication services. In 
this chapter I will answer the subquestion: why did the SEA attack communication services? I 
will explain that these attacks were meant to deter the opposition from using these services 
and functioned as an extended form of censorship. To have a better understanding of the 
attacks on communication services, I have placed this analysis in the context of malware 
campaigns that targeted the Syrian opposition.  
In the final chapter I will elaborate on the cyber attacks on the media. I will answer the 
subquestion: why did the SEA primarily attack media? In this chapter I will explain that the 
cyber attacks on media were not meant to cause damage, but rather to influence the opinions 
about Syria and to reduce incitement against the government. In this chapter I will also try to 
explain why the SEA has disappeared.   
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Chapter 1: Mapping out cyberspace 
Cyberspace is a new, but unknown, zone of combat in the Syrian war; to understand the 
behaviour of the Syrian Electronic Army, it is very relevant to have more insight in the 
broader rivalries in cyberspace. Therefore, it is necessary to know who is doing what in 
cyberspace. Who are the main cyber actors? Who or what are the targets? What is the relation 
between them? In this chapter I will answer the question: who are the main cyber actors in the 
Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2016 and who or what are their main targets? I will answer 
this question by making a network analysis on the basis of news articles about cyber attacks 
related to the war in Syria.  
 
Collecting data 
Cyber attacks are relevant and interesting data for analyzing the SEA’s strategy, because they 
could show broader patterns. Data about cyber attacks involve a relation between attackers 
and targets of which a social network can be made. Analyzing this network will show broader 
patterns and trends that are otherwise not visible. The broader patterns and trends can tell a lot 
about the main objectives and interests in the war. Through a network analysis, data about 
cyber attacks could map out the interesting and the valuable interplay between the different 
cyber actors.  
 For my network analysis it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of cyber 
attacks. By far the most cyber attacks have a criminal motivation and are not related to 
politics. Only a small amount of all cyber attacks are politically motivated. These can be 
divided in sabotage, espionage, and subversion. According to Thomas Rid, these three 
different categories of politically motivated cyber attacks serve other purposes. Cyber 
sabotage is predominantly technical; they are thus targeted against things and systems. Cyber 
espionage is meant to extract and exploit confidential, protected, or sensible information; 
these kinds of attacks are thus targeted against information. Subversion, in contrast, has the 
purpose to influence how people feel, think, and act; they are thus meant to target the human 
mind, often with the purpose to undermine the authorities.
41
   
 Both the categories of cyber sabotage and cyber espionage are rare. This is because 
these kinds of cyber operations are targeted attacks; they require more advanced technical 
skills and often specific information about the target. This kind of cyber attacks is thus not 
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easily carried out. According to Rid, examples of cyber sabotage are the Stuxnet worm that 
affected a nuclear plant in Iran in 2010, and the cyber attack against the Syrian air defence 
system that accompanied an Israeli airstrike during ‘Operation Orchard’ in 2007.42 An 
example of cyber espionage is operation ‘Titan Rain’ against American computer systems in 
2003. In this cyber operation military and governmental computer systems in the US were 
hacked and large amounts of sensible data were downloaded, presumably by Chinese 
hackers.
43
 Given the sophistication, the political and strategic targets, and the advanced 
technology that these cyber operations have, it is evident that state actors were behind them. 
But the problem is that these kinds of operations are carried out in complete secrecy and 
anonymity – no one is claiming accountability, which makes it hard to do research on these 
kinds of attacks.  
 A complete other category of cyber attacks is the category of subversion. This kind of 
cyber attacks is different because it is not about the quality of the attacks, but the quantity of 
the targets. Subversion is often used as an attempt to undermine authorities or another 
established order, or even to overthrow the government. While the attacks from this category 
are technically against computers and servers, the intentional targets are human minds: as 
many as possible of them should be affected. Examples of this kind of attacks are the cyber 
operations of the hackers collective Anonymous and the series of DDoS attacks in Estonia in 
2007, but also the use of social media by jihadist organizations or by opposition groups during 
the Arab Spring can be categorized as subversion. Subversion works by influencing human 
minds: undermining citizens’ trust in their leaders, sowing fear, or simply gaining support for 
a specific political cause.
44
  
 In the cyber dimension of the Syrian civil war, four methods of subversion are most 
often used. The first are DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks. With a DDoS attack a 
threat actor sends a huge amount of requests to a targeted server. The server will thereupon 
crash because it cannot process the abundant amount of data and will become unavailable for 
legitimate requests. The second method is website defacement. When a threat actor is able to 
break into the systems of a targeted website, he or she is able to change the visual appearance 
of the webpage and could post a (political) message. The third method is data leakage. When 
a threat actor has gained access to the database of a website, he or she could extract sensitive 
data such as names, telephone numbers, email addresses, passwords, and sometimes even 
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credit card numbers. This data could be used for espionage, but it becomes subversion when it 
is published to denigrate the target and to show its ‘weakness.’ The fourth method is account 
hijacking. With account hijacking a threat actor takes over someone’s account on a social 
media platform after having extracted the login credentials. The threat actor could then post 
messages in the name of someone else. These four methods do not require sophisticated 
technical skills and are not considered as politically relevant, but rather as a nuisance. 
However, these attacks are effective in reaching a broad public and could thus influence many 
people.
45
 
 In my research I focus on cyber attacks in the category of subversion because they are 
most relevant for my research objective and are easily accessible. Attacks in the subversion 
category are meant to reach a broad public; these attacks are therefore often visible. The 
initiators of these attacks often seek media attention to reach an even broader public. Because 
successful cyber attacks of the subversion category are very visible and affect many people, 
they are often reported. Media, and especially media focussing on IT related topics, report 
about the attacks and their consequences; reports of these attacks are thus easily accessible. 
Moreover, the attacks of non-state cyber actors almost exclusively belong to the category of 
subversion. Because of their limited abilities, non-state cyber actors are often not able to 
perform more technically sophisticated attacks for sabotage or espionage. And to serve a 
specific political cause, these attacks are often attributed. For researching the cyber attacks of 
the SEA, analyzing cyber attacks of the subversion category is thus most relevant. 
 From all the cyber attacks in the category of subversion, I have selected the attacks 
that are related to the war in Syria. I have indicated three modes of relatedness. Firstly, I 
consider cyber attacks related to the Syrian war if an attack or a cyber actor originates in 
Syria. Secondly, I consider cyber attacks related to the war in Syria if the target is or belongs 
to one of the regional (cyber) actors of the war. The regional element makes that international 
actors, such as the US, or transnational actors, such as Anonymous, who are also participating 
in other cyber conflicts, are not always included. Thirdly, I consider cyber attacks related to 
the Syrian war if an attack is motivated by a direct war-related interest.  
 With all the data about cyber attacks related to the war in Syria I have created my own 
database. I have gathered my data from other databases on cyber attacks, such as 
Hackmageddon and the database on cyber operations of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
and from news articles of media focussing on IT and technology related topics, such as Wired, 
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The Hacker News, HackRead, E Hacking News, Ars Technica and others. By combining these 
sources I am able to collect most relevant data and I can verify the data by other sources 
which make the date more reliable.  
 Creating my own database is necessary because none of the existing databases on 
cyber attacks is suitable for my research objective. The database of Hackmageddon contains 
lots of data about cyber attacks since 2011, which is thus very useful. However, the method 
that is used to gather the data is unclear and not all the data in the database is completely 
accurate; relying solely on this database will thus not yield reliable results. The database of 
the Council on Foreign Relations uses an elaborated and careful methodology in which every 
step is justified and limitations are mentioned,
46
 this database contains thus more reliable data. 
However, information about non-state actors is excluded because it is considered murkier and 
less reliable.
47
 Since I focus on non-state actors, this database is not suitable for my research.  
 According to my own compiled database, in a period between 2011 and 2016 there 
were 178 cyber attacks in total, of which 82 by the SEA (see also appendix I for a complete 
list of cyber attacks). The graph below shows the number of cyber attacks of all cyber actors 
and the SEA separately in every month. This graph makes visible that the bulk of the  
 Figure 1: Amount of cyber attacks in the period 2011-2016 
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cyber attacks was in 2013 and smaller upsurges happened in the first months of 2015 and 
2016. Though, the SEA shows a slightly different pattern. In the spring and summer of 2013, 
with the highest peak in August, the SEA is most active. In the last months of 2013 the SEA’s 
activity decreases, but in the beginning of 2014 the amount of the SEA’s cyber attacks 
increased again. In 2015 the SEA incidentally carried out a cyber attack while other actors 
were more active and halfway 2015 no cyber activities of the SEA were reported anymore. 
There were thus two waves of cyber attacks by the SEA: one in the summer of 2013 and one 
in 2014.  
With setting up my database I have tried to be as inclusive as possible, though this was 
not always possible: my database knows several limitations. First, it is possible that not all 
cyber attacks that occurred are documented. Cyber attacks that failed in getting media 
attention or that were not considered noteworthy have gone unnoticed. This might have 
happened especially in the beginning of the war when the Syrian Electronic Army was yet an 
unknown actor or when trivial Syrian websites were attacked. Second, it is possible that the 
media did report about a cyber attack but that I was not able to access it. The database consists 
of data from sources with an English speaking public; information irrelevant for this public 
did not end up in my database. A cyber attack in Syria might have been only reported by Arab 
journalists, but since my Arabic is not sufficient enough, I did not consult reports in Arabic.  
 Furthermore, the problem of attribution is also a major limitation of my database. 
Besides attacks with no attribution, there are also attacks with a false attribution, the so called 
‘false flag’ operations. A ‘false flag’ operation appears to come from a specific actor, but is in 
reality performed by another. An example is the hack on the French television station TV5 
Monde in May 2015. The hack appeared to come from hackers of the self-declared Islamic 
State (IS or ISIS) calling themselves the ‘Cyber Caliphate,’ but investigation later showed that 
the hack was actually carried out by Russian hackers.
48
 While I have excluded ‘false flag’ 
operations from my database, it might have happened that some unknown ‘false flag’ 
operations have remained.  
 Despite the mentioned limitations, I believe that my database provides a 
comprehensive representation of the interplay of cyber actors during the Syrian civil war. 
While my database is not exhaustible, it is much more comprehensive than data used by other 
studies on the SEA. The few other studies on the SEA rely predominantly on the cyber attacks 
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on Western media and a few other remarkable attacks. No other study provides a full 
overview of cyber attacks from the SEA and other rival cyber actors. Moreover, my database 
serves the purpose that it has: showing the broader patterns. A few missing or incorrect cyber 
attacks will not heavily influence the broader trends.  
  
Making a network analysis 
My network analysis consists of two main components: a total overview of the entire period 
and several overviews of the different phases in the war. For the total overview of the entire 
period I will provide a network of all data together. This total overview will show the larger 
trends and patterns in the war. For the overviews of the different phases I will provide several 
networks of only the data belonging to a specific phase. This phasal approach will show the 
smaller patterns in the war.  
 For the network analysis I use Gephi network analysis and visualization software. The 
Gephi software is able to process lots of data and its algorithms turn the data into network 
graphs. The network graphs could be analysed, manipulated, filtered and clustered for a better 
visual result. Furthermore, patterns can be emphasized by different thickness and colours. The 
nodes in the graphs represent the different actors; a bigger node indicates that the specific 
actor occurs more frequently. The relation between these actors (the cyber attacks) is 
represented by edges; a thicker line indicates a more frequently occurring relation. The arrow 
shows the direction of the cyber attack, thus from the attacker to the target. The colour of the 
node also indicates how often an actor occurs; nodes in a more greenish colour are more 
active and nodes in a more greyish colour are less active. The colour of the edge is identical to 
the colour of the source node. See figure 2 for the complete network of cyber attacks related 
to the Syrian war between 2011 and 2016.  
 The complete network of cyber attacks in the Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2016 
makes visible who the most important cyber actors were. Immediately visible on the right side 
is the SEA that has attacked a big bunch of unique targets. On the top of the graph is Syria 
located, targeted by a bunch of different non-state cyber actors. The bottom side of the graph 
looks a little messy with many different actors interconnected to each other. However, it is 
visible that many of them are directed towards the USA; the USA appears to be an important 
cyber target in the Syrian civil war. A final thing that stands out is Anonymous that with two 
firm edges seems to play a key role in the Syrian cyber conflict.   
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Figure 2: Network of cyber actors in Syrian civil war 2011-2016 
 Because a network graph that consists of lots of data tends to be vague, I have filtered 
the data for a better overview. With data divided into several categories, the network graph 
will be less murky and will be clearer and more abstract. In this way it is easier to distinguish 
patterns. I have distinguished the targets into the following categories: media, commercial, 
non-profit, communication services, universities, other state actors, and several websites. 
Targets that did not fit in one of these categories were placed in the category ‘other’. 
Furthermore, there were plenty of non-state cyber actors loyal to terror organization ISIS. 
Because these actors have similar agendas, I have grouped them together in the category ‘Pro-
ISIS cyber actors’. Finally, I have excluded all non-state cyber actors that only carried out one 
cyber attack. See figure 3 for the filtered network graph.  
 This filtered and more abstract network graph gives a slightly different overview of the 
Syrian cyber conflict. According to this graph, there were two major cyber actors: the Syrian 
Electronic Army and the Pro-ISIS cyber actors. They do not seem to be rivals because they 
did not attack each other. The SEA did not carry out cyber attacks on assets of ISIS, and the 
23 
 
 
Figure 3: Filtered network graph of cyber actors in the Syrian civil war 
Pro-ISIS cyber actors did not carry out cyber attacks on assets of Syria. While they did not 
attack exactly the same targets, it is striking that they did attack targets in the same categories. 
It looks like the SEA and the Pro-ISIS cyber actors had a similar strategy. Something else that 
is remarkable is that the SEA relatively often targeted popular communication services, such 
as Viber, Twitter and Skype. Although it is clear that the SEA predominantly attacked media, 
it is striking that the SEA relatively often attacked this category while no other cyber actor 
did. And a final thing that stands out is that Syria’s most important allies, Russia and Iran, 
both actively using their cyber powers in the international arena, barely participated in the 
cyber dimension of this conflict. 
Grouping cyber actors together into categories improves reliability as well. This 
especially counts for the several cyber actors loyal to ISIS. There are several pro-ISIS cyber 
actors active in the cyber conflict, among others: Cyber Caliphate, Islamic State Hacking 
Division, Team System DZ, FallaGa Team, and multiple other individuals or small groups. 
Some of these groups later merged into the group United Cyber Caliphate. The pro-ISIS 
groups were very dynamic; they appeared and disappeared, members were usually unknown, 
24 
 
and members could easily switch between or belong to multiple groups at the same time. One 
example was Junaid Hussain, also known under his alias TriCk, whose identity was revealed 
after being convicted for computer crime in 2012. In the first phase of the war, Junaid Hussain 
was member of hacking group TeaMp0isoN. Later, when he had joined ISIS, he became 
member of the group Cyber Caliphate, and apparently he was also the leader of the Islamic 
State Hacking Division.
49
 The different pro-ISIS cyber actors have the same hacking objective 
and seem to consist of a fixed group of people; it is therefore possible to treat them as one 
actor.  
 Another category that needs further explanation is the category of state actors. 
According to my data, state actors were almost exclusively targets. With a state as a cyber 
target I mean cyber attacks on government websites, cyber attacks on social media and email 
accounts of government officials, and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure that could 
heavily disrupt society, such as airports, banks, and power installations. The main state actors 
in the Syrian war, such as Syria and the USA, have a substantive position in the network 
graph. Other state actors that do not have an important role in the Syrian war and that 
occurred a few times or only once are categorized as ‘other state actors’.  
 
Phases in the Syrian civil war 
These two network graphs show the cyber connections over the entire period between 2011 
and 2016, but it might be more interesting to see how these relations have changed over the 
course of the war. To do this, I have divided the war into four phases that are characterized by 
specific events and specific actors. The first phase is the period between 15 March 2011 and 
19 April 2012. The second phase is between 19 April 2012 and 1 January 2014. The third 
phase is between 1 January 2014 and 30 September 2015. And the fourth phase is the period 
between 30 September 2015 and 22 December 2016. I have carefully selected these phases on 
the basis of watershed events.  
 The first phase is characterized by protests and an emerging armed opposition. The 
first anti-government protests in Syria began at 15 March 2011. These protests were inspired 
by the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but were also a reaction to the arrests and 
torture of children who had written anti-regime graffiti on walls in the public space in the 
rural city of Daraa at 6 March. Security forces responded heavily with violent means to the 
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protesters, which had only a deteriorating effect on the situation. The opposition, which was 
also sectarian divided, arranged and armed themselves. Clashes between the government 
forces and the armed opposition turned the revolution into a violent conflict.
50
  
 An attempt of the UN to prevent further escalation of the conflict failed at 19 April 
2012. After a failed ceasefire of the Arab League, the United Nations (UN) got involved to 
appease the growing violence in Syria. Kofi Annan, as appointed UN mediator, tried to reach 
a ceasefire agreement between the government and the opposition. On 12 April 2012 a six-
point-plan was signed with the goal of opening up internal political contestation and a wider 
transformation of Syrian governance. However, at 19 April, barely a week after the signing of 
the agreement, both the government and the opposition continued their fight; this time with 
heavier violence than before. In early June, the opposition officially revoked its commitment 
to the agreement, whereupon the UN ceased its operations in Syria.
51
  
 After the failure of the UN ceasefire agreement, the violence escalated and the conflict 
developed into a full-blown civil war; this period is identified as phase 2 of the war. The 
security forces evolved their tactics; heavy military equipment, such as tanks, artillery and air 
forces, were deployed. Even some cases of using chemical weapons in opposition 
neighbourhoods were reported. The heavy violence caused also a flow of refugees to 
neighbouring countries and eventually to Europe. This phase is also characterized by the 
successes of the opposition. As government troops withdrew in the north and the east of Syria, 
opposition forces were able to conquer a significant territory. However, because of exhaustion 
and internal divisions, the opposition was not able to expand its military successes. In 2013 a 
stalemate appeared.
52
  
 In 2014 a new development within the divisions of the opposition was able to force a 
breakthrough in the appeared stalemate: Islamist militants gained momentum. Islamist groups, 
such as the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), both of them 
offshoots of al-Qaida, took over control in some of the opposition territories in the eastern 
part of Syria. These terrorist organizations were strengthened by an influx of Islamist fighters 
from all over the world who supported the Islamist cause. Especially ISIS had the aspiration 
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to establish an Islamic ruled state. While originally from Iraq, the organization of ISIS saw a 
chance in the chaos of the war and expanded its working area to Syria.
53
  
 The third phase of the war is characterized by the rise of terror organization ISIS. In 
the beginning, the rise of ISIS took place very gradually; therefore no exact starting date for 
this phase can be determined. Somewhere early January 2014 ISIS took over control of major 
cities in Eastern Syria and in Iraq, such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Raqqa. From their 
stronghold Raqqa, ISIS fighters conquered large territories in Syria and Iraq,
54
 and directly 
after conquering a new territory a strict version of the Islamic law was implemented.
55
 At 29 
June 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Caliphate, 
claimed that it was an independent state and changed its name to Islamic State (IS).
56
 ISIS 
became especially notorious for its severe atrocities, such as mass murder, beheading of 
political opponents and foreign journalists, torture, enslavement, forced prostitution, and so 
on.  
 The rapid conquests of large territories and the severe atrocities of ISIS led to growing 
concerns in the international community. In an attempt to counter the extraordinary rise of 
ISIS, an international coalition led by the US was formed in October 2014. The international 
coalition against ISIS bombed strategic locations in Iraq and Syria to prevent further advance 
of ISIS. This operation was also meant to protect the autonomous Kurdish region in Northern 
Iraq and to shield non-Muslim communities in the area.
57
 In September 2015 Russia began to 
intervene in the Syrian war as well, which led to a new phase of the war.  
 The fourth phase of the Syrian war is characterized by Russian intervention. The first 
Russian airstrike on Syrian territory was on 30 September 2015. But the Russians did not 
intervene with airstrikes alone; they also deployed troops and other military equipment. 
Russia initially claimed that they targeted ISIS only, but it soon appeared that mainly the 
Syrian rebels were affected. Due to Russian support, the Syrian regime was able to make a 
comeback and regained most of the lost territories. This is symbolized at 22 December 2016 
when the government forces recaptured a major opposition stronghold, the city of Aleppo.
58
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Especially this fourth phase is characterized by geopolitical interests. The war in Syria 
is not only a regional conflict; the war is also exploited by international actors for obtaining 
their own interests. This is especially the case with the disagreements between Western 
powers and Russia, and to a lesser extent also China. For the Western powers promoting 
democracy, promoting human rights, curbing the refugee flows, and stopping terrorism are the 
main priorities. However, Russia and China interpret the US policies towards Syria, and 
towards the Middle East in general, rather as a manifestation of an overall strategy of forcible 
regime change. According to them, the US policies are not the best for the region, but will 
only advance the preferences of the Western powers themselves.
59
 The war in Syria thus 
sharpened the tensions between the main global powers. For an overview of the different 
phases, see the timeline below.  
Figure 4: Phases in the Syrian civil war 
 
Patterns in cyberspace 
Each of the four phases forms completely other episodes in the war; these phases are also 
visible in the war’s cyber dimension. In each phase of the war different actors play a main 
role and each phase is characterized by specific kinds of events. This is also the case in 
cyberspace where specific cyber actors were especially active in specific phases of the war.  
Just as phase 1 of the war is characterized by protests, the cyber dimension in this 
phase is dominated by hacktivist groups. The most important cyber actor in this phase is 
Anonymous, a transnational hacker's collective. In the first phase of the Syrian war, 
Anonymous exclusively targeted assets belonging to Syria. Syria is also the main target for a 
bunch of other hacktivist groups: AntiSec, RevoluSec, TeaMp0isoN, and Telecomix are all, 
just like Anonymous, activist groups from the hackers’ scene, the so-called ‘hacktivists.’ 
Driven by different ideologies, most of these hacktivist groups used to be rivals in the hackers 
scene. However, while all of them are driven by different ideas and ideologies, it is clear that 
they all supported the Syrian revolution. For the network graph of the first phase, see figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Phase 1, hacktivist groups attacked Syria 
From all these hacktivist groups, RevoluSec needs some further explanation. 
RevoluSec (Revolution Security) is, just as AntiSec (Anti Security), closely affiliated with 
Anonymous. AntiSec and RevoluSec are both subdivisions within the Anonymous collective, 
but operated independently. While AntiSec is more of an elite section within the collective,
60
 
RevoluSec focussed completely on infiltrating Syrian government servers.
61
 RevoluSec and  
Anonymous worked closely together and some of the participants of RevoluSec were also 
active in the broader Anonymous collective, while others were not.
62
 However, because 
RevoluSec was just a small and unknown group and because it was closely connected to 
Anonymous, I believe that many cyber attacks of RevoluSec were attributed to Anonymous. It 
is thus possible that RevoluSec has had a bigger share in the hacktivism against Syria.  
The hacktivism in this phase resembled the real world situation: activists supporting 
the revolution in Syria while regime supporters tried to reduce their leverage. The SEA, 
supporting the Assad regime, was in this phase still a minor actor in cyberspace and it did not 
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seem to have an evolved strategy yet. In an attempt to retaliate the flood of cyber attacks from 
the hacktivist groups on Syrian assets, the SEA hacked Anonymous’ unofficial website twice: 
on 24 July
63
 and again on 9 August.
64
 The SEA furthermore carried out cyber attacks on 
media and universities. However, when the Syrian conflict escalated and the second phase of 
the war started, the cyber conflict became a lot more complex.  
 In the second phase the cyber conflict becomes really a regional affair. Lots of 
different regional cyber actors emerged, attacking a broad range of different targets. The SEA 
has become the main cyber actor. While the group was very active in targeting many different 
categories, the clear focus on the media has emerged as well. In this phase the SEA also began 
targeting the category of communication services. And while Syria was still an important 
cyber target, the transnational hacktivist groups have largely left the stage. Anonymous has 
become marginal and the other established hacktivist groups have disappeared altogether. 
Syria has now become the target of other non-state cyber actors. Most of these actors are 
individuals or small groups from the region (see figure 6).  
  
Figure 6: Phase 2, the SEA became the major cyber actor 
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 Besides the SEA, another regional cyber actor stands out in this phase: Dr. SHA6H. 
Dr. SHA6H was a Syrian individual belonging to the Syrian opposition (he also referred to 
himself as ‘Free Syrian H4ack3r’). But interestingly enough, he did not attack assets of the 
Syrian regime. Instead, he attacked organizations and states that supported the Syrian 
opposition or were not related to the Syrian conflict at all. In his messages on defaced 
websites, he put emphasis on the critical situation in Syria and blamed his targets of not doing 
enough. He stated furthermore that his cyber attacks were about the messages, not about the 
targets.
65
 
 In the third phase the SEA remained the main actor, though, there were a lot of 
changes in cyberspace; see figure 7. In the real world war, ISIS was becoming stronger, which 
was also visible in cyberspace. Pro-ISIS cyber actors were new on the stage and were very 
active in attacking different kind of targets. Just like the SEA, the pro-ISIS cyber actors were 
primarily targeting media. That ISIS has become more important in this phase is also visible 
by the fact that Anonymous began attacking ISIS. While in previous phases Anonymous’ sole 
target was Syria, in this phase Anonymous has changed its target to ISIS affiliated assets.   
 
Figure 7: Phase 3, the rise of ISIS 
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While the SEA was the main actor in the previous two phases, in the fourth phase the 
SEA has completely disappeared from the network graph; see figure 8. Instead, the pro-ISIS 
cyber actors have become the main actors in cyberspace. However, these actors have changed 
their main target. Instead of the media, the pro-ISIS cyber actors now predominantly attack 
the US. The US has thereby become the main cyber target in this phase. It is furthermore 
remarkable that the Syrian regime, which regained many of its lost territories, is not attacked 
at all in cyberspace, and that Russia, who is partly responsible for the collapse of ISIS, is not 
attacked by the pro-ISIS cyber groups. The global powers, the US and Russia, are not actively 
participating in this cyber conflict.  
 
Figure 8; Phase 4, the SEA has disappeared 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to find an answer to the question who the main actors in cyberspace – 
‘cyber actors’ – were in the Syrian civil war  between 2011 and 2016. To find an answer to 
this question, I did a network analysis of collected data about cyber attacks related to the 
Syrian conflict. My network analysis shows that the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), hackers 
collective Anonymous, and a collection of pro-ISIS cyber groups were the most important 
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actors. The SEA and the pro-ISIS cyber groups especially targeted the media, Anonymous’ 
main targets were assets belonging to the Syrian state and to the organization of ISIS.  
 A  more in depth analysis, in which I have divided the period of 2011 to 2016 into four 
phases, shows different patterns in each phase. In the first phase Anonymous was the main 
cyber actor, exclusively targeting Syria, while the SEA was still marginal. The SEA became 
more important in the second and third phases, when it even became the main cyber actor 
especially targeting media. In phase four the SEA suddenly disappeared. Instead, pro-ISIS 
cyber groups became prominent with a clear focus on targeting the US. Because the SEA was 
only active in the first three phases, I will in my further research focus on these phases.  
33 
 
Chapter 2: From hacktivism to warfare  
In chapter 1 we have seen that the Syrian Electronic Army is especially active in phases 2 and 
3 of the Syrian civil war. But to understand the strategy of the SEA, it is necessary to 
understand in what circumstances and with what motivation the SEA has emerged in the 
previous phase. Therefore, I will also analyse the cyber attacks of the SEA in phase 1 of the 
war. In this chapter, I will answer the following question: What is the Syrian Electronic Army 
and why and how has it emerged? I will answer this question by analysing the messages on 
defaced webpages and messages on other online platforms, in which responsibility for the 
cyber attacks are claimed. I will collect these sources from my own compiled database on 
cyber attacks related to the Syrian civil war. Before I move on to the emergence of the SEA, I 
first want to explain the background of internet and internet accessibility in Syria.  
 
Internet in Syria  
Internet accessibility in Syria began to grow when Bashar al-Assad became president in 2000. 
Assad can be described as a modernizer; he emphasized technological modernization and he 
introduced internet to the broader Syrian public. While internet in Syria already was 
introduced, internet access was very limited and was only accessible for a selected part of the 
elite.
66
 Under Assad’s regime, also ordinary people were able to get internet; internet access 
had expanded from 30,000 connections in 2000 to 5 million in 2012.
67
 However, although 
internet became accessible for a broader public, the internet connections remained in a way 
limited. The connections were slow given the small bandwidth, and 3G services remained for 
a long time unavailable.
68
 Despite the limited internet connections, the growth of internet use 
in Syria is a sign of modernization. 
 As part of the modernization policy, Assad promoted internet use among the Syrian 
people. According to Assad, a computer and technology enthusiast himself, the qualities of a 
modern society are transparency, knowledge production, and speed and order, which are 
represented by new technology, such as internet. Therefore, a number of measures to promote 
internet use were implemented: computer lessons were given at schools, internet cafes were 
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permitted, and the costs of internet connections were reduced.
69
 IT and computer science are 
furthermore promoted among the Syrian public by the Syrian Computer Society (SCS). The 
SCS was already founded in 1989 by Assad’s brother, Bassel al-Assad, and from 1994 to 
2000 the organization was headed by Assad himself. While the SCS has officially an 
independent status, it still maintains strong connections with the Syrian government. 
70
 
  Although internet use in Syria was promoted, it did not mean that the entire internet 
was freely accessible. Just like other media, internet in Syria was heavily censored. Internet 
censorship usually involves filtering and blocking websites. This method could target an 
individual computer, a wider intranet, or even an internet service provider. To filter and block 
websites from the entire internet using population in Syria, the latter is most effective because 
it affects all internet users from that specific internet provider. When a user visits a blocked 
website, he or she gets an ‘access denied’ page. Internet censorship is most often used to 
suppress dissemination of messages opposed to the political views of the regime.
71
 Internet 
censorship in Syria is so profound that the organization Reporters Without Borders, an 
international organization that promotes freedom of information and freedom of the press, 
structurally ranks Syria as one of the worst offenders of internet freedom.
72
  
 As a response to heavy internet censorship, people began to use tools to circumvent 
the blockades. Internet censorship circumvention tools rely on proxy servers, which serve as a 
‘middleman’ between two communication parties. The proxy server is not blocked and is able 
to reach the internet user in Syria and the blocked website. Through the proxy server, Syrian 
internet users can reach the dissident content from blocked websites. And even if a proxy 
server becomes unavailable, because of a technical problem or because the proxy server itself 
is blocked by the authorities, another server can be used instead. The authorities are therefore 
constantly blocking newly discovered proxy servers as well.
73
 Because any server could 
technically function as a proxy server, the internet users and the Syrian authorities are 
constantly playing cat and mouse.  
 Effectively censoring the internet means in fact blocking large parts of the internet, 
which has counterproductive side effects. Information and communication through internet is 
for many people almost a necessity of life. Besides the economic disadvantages that a limited 
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internet poses, disrupting people’s social life on the internet can make people really upset. 
This can be further illustrated by the example of the internet blockade in Egypt during the 
revolutions in 2011. New protests were organized and promoted through social media and the 
use of social media mobilized many Egyptian people. In an attempt to constrain the revolution 
the Egyptian authorities completely blocked the internet. This was a counterproductive 
decision because it made people angry and the measure led to even more protests.
74
 This 
counterproductive side effect of internet censorship really poses a dilemma for authoritarian 
states.  
 Learned from the Egyptian example, the Syrian authorities employed other techniques 
to control the use of internet at the beginning of the revolution. Instead of blocking the entire 
internet, the Syrian regime started to monitor the internet. Thereby, the regime knows who is 
doing what on the internet and internet users could be kept in check through threats, physical 
intimidation, and prosecution.
75
 Internet traffic directed to a secure site (websites beginning 
with https://) was redirected to an unsecure site (beginning with http://) to avoid encryption of 
the traffic.
76
 By monitoring all the internet traffic, dissidents on the internet, including their 
names and locations, could be detected for targeted violence or prosecution.
77
 One could risk 
years of imprisonment for visiting an opposition website or for sending or forwarding a 
controversial email.
78
 By monitoring the internet traffic, cyberspace became a new place of 
fear.  
 The digital infrastructure in Syria was exceptionally suitable for monitoring practices. 
The digital infrastructure in Syria is highly centralized; there are only a few connections to the 
rest of the world. Usually this is a disadvantage because it makes the digital infrastructure 
susceptible for interruptions and blackouts, but for the practice of internet traffic monitoring it 
is valuable. Intelligence services could easily access the centred surveillance systems. By 
querying specific keywords the intelligence services could easily search for illegal traffic and 
locate and identify the user. Furthermore, the risk of blackouts can also be used strategically 
as a form of sabotage. By intentionally and strategically causing an internet blackout, the 
opposition could be prevented to communicate through internet at all.
79
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 Due to the monitoring techniques of the Syrian authorities, using social media became 
a risky practice. Prior to the revolution, social media platforms, such as Facebook, used to be 
blocked since Syrian authorities had discovered that Syrians began making online friends with 
Israelis.
80
 But shortly before the uprising began, in a period between January 2011 and April 
2011, the Syrian authorities dared to unblock the social media platforms. The unblocking of 
the social media platforms was merely a ploy that would cause the activists to abandon their 
censorship circumvention tools.
81
 As a result, Syrian accounts on these platforms increased 
heavily.
82
 But the use of social media was risky; even by using a false name, it was easy for 
the authorities to detect and identify dissidents. Especially activists and journalists were 
vulnerable because they frequently produced material politically opposed to the government 
on online platforms and they often did not know how to hide their identities online and how to 
use encryption techniques and other digital protection measures.
83
  
 And here the hacktivist movements come in. Due to their illegal hacking activities and 
their profound knowledge of IT, hackers know very well how to conceal their identities 
online. The more idealistically motivated hackers, the hacktivists, who promote internet 
freedom and freedom of expression in general, love to share their knowledge with the Syrian 
activists. In the first phase of the war the Syrian activists and the hacktivist movements, such 
as Anonymous, form a strategic alliance. To understand the alliance between the Syrian 
activists and Anonymous, one should first have a look at Anonymous’ involvement in other 
revolutions of the Arab Spring.  
 
Anonymous and the Arab Spring 
Anonymous is a hard to define collective of people active in cyberspace. It is not really 
suitable to speak of Anonymous as an organization; Anonymous is rather a loosely connected 
network of anonymous participants, called ‘Anons’ (it is not suitable to speak of members 
either), and it does not have a leadership or a hierarchical structure. It is therefore more 
suitable to define Anonymous as a collective.
84
 The collective is especially known for its 
worldwide cyber activism, but the collective does not only consist of hackers. One does not 
need to be a hacker to participate; supporting the idea of Anonymous is already enough to be 
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Anonymous. The ideology of Anonymous is often described as ‘cyber libertarianism,’ the 
idea of internet free from any government regulation, but Anonymous has more 
characteristics. One striking characteristic is its nihilistic and absurdist humour that outsiders 
would not appreciate.
85
  
 Anonymous’ cyber operations are an effluence of the combination of its humour and 
its ideology. The operations are done for the ‘lulz’ (for the fun) and can be characterized as 
‘pranksterism’ or ‘trolling’; they furthermore used to be targeted against organizations and 
institutions with policies that impinge freedom in any possible way.
86
 One of the first big and 
notorious operations was ‘Project Chanology’ against the Scientology Church in 2008. 
Besides DDoS attacks on its websites, the Scientology Church was targeted by people 
wearing Guy Fawkes masks protesting on the streets in front of the church’ buildings, by 
orders of dozens of unpaid pizzas and escorts to the same addresses, by various phone pranks, 
and by an abundance of fax images of nude body parts.
87
 Later, the operations became 
technically more sophisticated, but were still meant for entertainment.  
 A turning point in Anonymous’ hacktivism appeared to be its participation during the 
Arab Spring: Anonymous became a political actor. When the revolution in Tunisia began, 
Anonymous chose side with the Tunisian opposition. At 2 January 2011 Operation Tunisia, 
‘OpTunisia,’ was announced in which all Tunisian government websites were attacked. Due 
to the effective cooperation of well-skilled hackers, site after site was defaced, ‘DDoSed’, or 
otherwise affected in a short period of time. While the cyber attacks themselves would not 
have had such an impact on the revolution, they drew attention of the international press for 
the worse situation of censorship and internet freedom in Tunisia. For the first time in 
Anonymous’ history, the collective had attacked a state with the purpose of toppling a 
government.
88
 
 In the course of the Arab Spring, Anonymous’ involvement became more profound. 
When, during the revolution in Egypt, the internet was shut off at 28 January 2011, 
Anonymous and Telecomix started to cooperate in order to re-establish an internet 
connection. Telecomix, another hacktivist movement with a cyber libertarian ideology, has 
some major differences with Anonymous regarding the used methods of cyber activism. 
Telecomix is for example opposed to the use of DDoS attacks because it denies the internet 
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freedom of others. However, in the urgent need of an internet connection, both of the 
movements were able to work together and to re-establish circuitous internet connections 
through satellite phone or landline.
89
  
 Anonymous decided to participate in the Syrian revolution after Syrian activists called 
them for help. In the week of the first protests, Syrian activists approached Anonymous with 
the request to take down some important government websites. Such an act would be breaking 
news on national and other Arab news websites and would draw more attention for their 
cause. In a statement in a blog on wordpress at 27 March 2011, Anonymous declared its 
support for the Syrian activists and the Syrian revolution. Furthermore, in the statement 
Anonymous made a request to “all other free citizens of the world” to support and to 
contribute to ‘Operation Syria.’90 
 However, the first campaigns against the Syrian government had to wait until 3 June 
2011. On Friday 3 June 2011, also called the ‘Friday of the Children,’ more and heavier 
protests were expected, whereupon the Syrian authorities strategically switched of the internet 
for that day. At 6:35 AM local time, two-thirds of the Syrian network went down; only the 
command and control servers of the Syrian authorities remained online. This internet blackout 
severely disrupted the coordination of the protests.
91
 Moreover, it provoked outrage among 
the hacktivist movements. At the same day, on Pastebin a threatening message from an 
anonymous source appeared:
92
  
Greetings To The Media of the World -- 
 
This is a message from Anonymous. It has come to our attention that the tyrant and human 
rights abuser Bashar Assad the so called president or dictator of Syria has shut down the 
internet within Syria, thus further isolating and terrorizing the freedom loving people of 
Syria who have already suffered so much from this evil regime. 
 
So today we will begin a program of removing from the internet the websites of the Syrian 
Embassies abroad. We will begin with these two Targets which we will delete from the 
interwebz at precisely 9:30 AM SYT on Saturday - June 4, 2011. 
  
Syrian Embassy in France:  www.amb-syr.fr  
 
                                                          
89
 Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, 192; Eva Galperin and Jillian C. York, “Syria Goes Dark,” Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, November 29, 2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/syria-goes-dark. 
90
 “Operation Syria: To the people of Syria, & all the other free citizens of the World,” Anonymous: Operation 
Syria, Serpent’s Embrace, March 27, 2011, https://serpentsembrace.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/anonymous-
operation-syria/.  
91
 Racicot, “The Syrian Conflict in the Cyber Environment,” 21; Chloe Albanesius, “Internet Access in Syria 
Goes Down Amidst Protests,” PCMag, June 3, 2011, https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386369,00.asp.  
92
 “Untitled,” Pastebin, June 3, 2011, https://pastebin.com/Kww0QN3C.  
39 
 
Syrian Embassy in Saudi Arabia:   syrianembassy-sa.org 
 
So long as Assad remains in power and the criminal and evil regime retains its ability to 
torture, kill, and imprison their own people; Anonymous will continue this campaign of 
removing the Syrian Embassy websites from the internet and interfering with the 
communications channels via Black Fax and E-Mail Bomb campaigns. The butchers of Syria 
can damn well EXPECT  US ! 
  
We Are Anonymous - We Are Everywhere - We Are Legion - We Never Forget - We Never 
Forgive............  
 
EXPECT  US  --  Anonymous 93 
 
OpSyria 
Anonymous’ first DDoS attacks as part of ‘OpSyria’ against Syrian government websites 
would probably not have drawn much media attention. I was not able to trace the cyber 
attacks on the Syrian embassy websites nor on any other government website in any news 
report. Anonymous performs so many cyber attacks that it is hard for them to continuously 
grab the attention of the media. However, it is likely that the cyber attacks on the embassy 
websites were carried out, and probably followed by many more cyber attacks on government 
websites, because at a certain point the Syrian Electronic Army starts to retaliate.  
 In the summer of 2011 the SEA began retaliating by attacking Anonymous’ social 
network site AnonPlus.com. AnonPlus was set up as an alternative social network site after 
the collective was banned from Google+, but the site did not function as its official website. 
However, the website is one of the few traceable domains of the collective, thus the site is 
often targeted in cyber disputes between hacker groups. On 24 July 2011 the SEA defaced the 
website for the first time. On the defaced webpage they left pictures of Assad, the emblem of 
the SEA, and the message:94  
Hacked By Th3 Pr0 & SaQeR SyRia  
Hacked By Syrian Hacker 
Syrian Electronic Soldiers | Page: 45  
The PRo 
Pr0@hotmail.nl 
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On 8 August 2011 the SEA defaced AnonPlus again as a retaliation of Anonymous’ cyber 
attack on the website of the Syrian Ministry of Defence a day earlier. On this defaced 
webpage, in a message in Arabic and in English, the SEA accuses Anonymous of defending 
the terrorism of the Muslim Brotherhood.
95
 
 Anonymous’ defacement of the website of the Syrian Ministry of Defence has drawn 
more attention; it was one of the most touching hacks of Anonymous against the Syrian 
regime. In its defacement, Anonymous emphasized its support for the Syrian revolution and 
its own non-violent character, as opposed to the Assad regime. The defaced webpage showed 
in the background the flag of the Syrian National Coalition with the logo of Anonymous of a 
suit without head replacing the middle star. Furthermore the defaced webpage showed 
pictures of Assad’s atrocities and a message in English and Arabic in which the Syrian people 
is encouraged to persist and in which the Syrian military is called to rise up against the evil 
regime.
96
  
 But the most notorious and most substantive cyber attack of OpSyria was by far the 
leakage of 2.4 million emails from Syrian politicians and companies, also known as the ‘Syria 
Files.’ On 5 February 2012 hackers of Anonymous successfully hacked into dozens of Syrian 
email servers where they found a massive number of important emails. The emails, dating 
back to August 2006, came, amongst others, from prominent Syrian politicians, including 
Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma.
97
 In March 2012 several thousand of the emails were 
passed to The Guardian that revealed that, despite the ongoing revolution, Assad and his 
family still enjoyed a luxurious life.
98
 However, the largest part of the data was sent to 
Anonymous’ ally Wikileaks. Five months after the massive breach, on 5 July 2012, Wikileaks 
published the 2.4 million files and a few days later, Anonymous posted a message on Pastebin 
in which it claimed credits for the leak.
99
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The emergence of the SEA  
It is often assumed that the Syrian Electronic Army has emerged as a response to the cyber 
attacks on the Syrian government as part of OpSyria. With announcing OpSyria, Anonymous 
initiated the cyber conflict in Syria. In an attempt to defend Syria in cyberspace, pro-regime 
hackers formed the SEA to strike back against Anonymous.
100
 This is also what the SEA itself 
stated on its no longer existent website: “We are Syrian youths who responded to the call of 
duty after our homeland, Syria, was subjected to cyber attacks. We decided to respond 
actively under the name of Syrian Electronic Army”101  
 However, the SEA is more offensive than it claims to be: earlier cyber attacks of the 
group can be traced back. The first defacement of AnonPlus by the SEA was signed by 
someone calling himself The Pro, Th3 Pr0, or The Pr0. This nickname appears also in earlier 
defacements. For example, on 6 July 2011 the website of the University of California was 
defaced by a person with the same nickname and with the same Dutch email address, leaving 
a pro-regime message:
102
   
Hacked 
The Pro 
we are sorry to destroy your sites , but your government’s policies and the interfere in our 
Interior affairs forced us to hack your official sites so you will be able to listen to our voices 
live from Syria , we love our country and we love our President Bashar al Assad and we will 
not allow anyone to interfere in our Internal Affairs 
PR0@Hotmail.NL 
The OpenNet Initiative, a collaborative partnership between the University of Toronto and 
Harvard University that investigates internet filtering and surveillance practices, has found 
more targeted websites between May 2011 and June 2011 by the same group of people. Most 
of the targeted websites were Dutch and Israeli business and personal websites, defaced with 
anti-Israel and anti-US content. However, OpenNet Initiative states that these early attacks do 
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not seem to be related to the Syrian war or to Syrian politics, the sites were just vulnerable 
opportunities.
103
  
 Besides these vulnerable opportunities, the SEA was also very active on social media, 
especially on Facebook. On the SEA’s own Facebook page, which continuously was deleted 
by the Facebook administrators, the SEA called its followers to carry out DDoS attacks on 
opposition websites and on biased media. Though, these attacks were doomed to fail because 
of the limited bandwidth in Syria.
104
 Furthermore, the SEA was active in hijacking Facebook 
and other social media accounts of activists.
105
 Given that social media were main 
communication tools of the opposition, compromising these accounts was particularly 
effective in disrupting the activists’ communication. Moreover, it caused an environment of 
distrust because any Facebook friend’s account could be hijacked.  
 In the early cyber activities of the SEA a bunch of different nicknames appeared, 
which is a starting point for speculating about the member’s identities. OpenNet Initiative 
mentions, besides The Pr0, the nicknames: ArabAttack, The Shadow, SaQer Syria, Sy Team, 
al3rab, or simply “under the brigade of the Syrian Electronic Army.”106 IntelCrawler, a cyber 
threat intelligence company, has investigated the online traces of the supposed members of 
the SEA and has identified eight key members with the nicknames: The Pr0, SyRiAn_34G13 
(Syrian Eagle), The Shadow, Tiger, Soul, Vikt0r, Syrian Hawk, and Osmancode. The 
nicknames Saqer Syria, Sy Team, and al3rab were, according to IntelCrawler, all aliases of 
The Pr0.
107
 Furthermore, as part of OpSyria, Anonymous also tried to expose the identities of 
the SEA members. According to Anonymous, some of the members came from Romania and 
Russia and the group would be led by a guy named Hatem Deeb.
108
 However, this was 
strongly denied by The Pr0: Deeb was only a friend and a member of the SCS.
109
  
 Something that is also strongly denied is its supposed connection with the Syrian 
government, though there are some links between the SEA and the Syrian regime. The SEA’s 
no longer existent website was initially, before it was operated from Russia, hosted by a 
server of the Syrian Computer Society (SCS). Furthermore, the SEA enjoys so much freedom 
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in the heavy monitored Syrian cyber domain that it must have approval of the Syrian 
authorities. It should be impossible for the SEA to operate in the Syrian cyber domain without 
approval or even without direction from the regime. However, any government connection is 
consistently denied by the SEA.
110
  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to give an answer to the question what the Syrian Electronic Army is 
and how and why the group has emerged. I tried to answer this question by analyzing the 
messages on defaced webpages and the messages on other online platforms in which 
responsibility is claimed. Furthermore, to have a better understanding of these messages, I 
have placed them in a broader historical context. A first impression of the data in its context 
suggests that the Syrian Electronic Army has emerged as a response to the cyber attacks on 
the Syrian government of Anonymous’ OpSyria, an impression that the SEA also asserts on 
its own website. 
  However, a closer look at the data shows that the members of the SEA were already 
active before OpSyria was launched. In the first months of the Syrian revolution, the SEA was 
not yet well established, but its members, a group of young people supportive of but not 
affiliated to the Syrian government, were already active under different nicknames. These 
people were mainly active on Facebook and other social media platforms. By hijacking the 
social media accounts of important activists, the SEA was able to disrupt their communication 
and to cause a sphere of distrust. Already in the very first phase of its existence, the SEA had 
thus a strategic purpose in supporting of the Syrian regime.  
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Chapter 3: A sphere of cyber fear 
As the violence in Syria escalates and as the revolution turns into warfare, the hacktivist 
movements largely leave the stage. Because the hacktivist movements are principally 
occupied with pursuing their ideals, they do not have an interest in being involved in a 
complicated war. After the victories in Tunisia and Egypt, the hacktivists were in an 
invincible spirit and thought that it would be easy to topple Assad as well. But things turned 
out differently; OpSyria took already for over a year and the cyber dispute with the SEA has 
exhausted Anonymous. For Anonymous, hacktivism is mainly a form of entertainment, but 
participating in a war is no fun anymore wherefore they largely lost their interest for Syria.
111
  
 The network analysis in chapter 1 has shown that the Syrian Electronic Army has 
become more active in the second and third phases of the war. While the SEA particularly 
attacked Western media, quite a lot of the cyber attacks were targeted against communication 
services. This is especially remarkable because the SEA was the only cyber actor targeting 
this category. In this chapter I will answer the question why the SEA has attacked the 
category of communication services. To answer this question I will analyze the messages on 
defaced webpages and on other online platforms, which I have collected in my database. 
Furthermore, I will place these messages in a broader context of malware campaigns 
threatening the Syrian opposition.  
 
Phishing and Trojans 
In the beginning of the second phase of the Syrian war, together with the escalation of real 
world violence, the battle on social media intensified. Accounts of Syrian activists on 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social media platforms were more often the target of 
hijacking. Moreover, the methods used for account hijacking have become more sophisticated 
and efficacious. Login credentials were gathered on a large scale by phishing through fake 
websites resembling the trusted social media platforms and through malware (malicious 
software). The malicious websites and software were designed for the Syrian opposition in 
particular: dozens of unique malware circulating in Syria are reported.
112
 These developments 
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made cyberspace a dangerous place to hang out for Syrian activists and other members of the 
opposition.  
 Phishing and malware attacks were carried out intensively and had a broad range of 
potential targets. The first incidents of these attacks were already observed in late 2011 and 
throughout the war new incidents have been reported. Though, the peak of phishing and 
malware attacks was in 2012. In the course of the war various tools were used, but a larger 
pattern appeared of available RATs (Remote Access Tools), software that provides remote 
access to a computer system, combined with well-informed social engineering. Members of 
the Syrian opposition have been persistently targeted by the phishing and malware campaigns, 
but also employees of NGOs and journalists have been targeted. The phishing and malware 
campaigns contributed to the online climate of limited connectivity, surveillance, and 
occasional internet blackouts.
113
  
 There are different methods to gather login credentials; in the Syrian context Trojans 
and phishing were most often used. Trojans are a type of malicious software that is disguised 
as legitimate programs or files. Once installed on a computer system, the Trojan allows the 
threat actor remote access to the host computer.
114
 In the context of the Syrian civil war, 
Trojans are often disguised as fake revolutionary documents or fake encryption tools, which 
were interesting for potential victims in the opposition. Phishing is a method to extract 
confidential information through fraudulent websites that imitate a trusted website. Potential 
victims are asked to log in; but instead of logging in, the fraudulent website captures the login 
credentials and other relevant data.
115
 This method is customarily used to extract financial 
information by imitating the website of a familiar bank, but in the context of the Syrian war 
social media platforms are imitated and visitors are seduced to sign in.  
 Phishing methods are relatively simple to extract personal information and were 
frequently used in the first months of 2012. For example, in March 2012 a fake YouTube 
website was online, completely customized for a Syrian opposition public: the fake YouTube 
website resembled the Arabic YouTube website and hosted several pro-opposition videos. In 
order to leave a comment, a potential victim needed to enter his or her YouTube login 
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credentials.
116
 In a similar vein, several fake Facebook websites resembling the Arabic 
Facebook version were found in April 2012. Potential victims were seduced to these 
fraudulent websites by interesting, but fake, news stories that contained a link to the malicious 
website. In order the read the article or to watch the video, potential victims, not being aware 
that they were not on the genuine website, first needed to enter their login credentials.
117
 In 
both cases, the login credentials were sent to the threat actor.  
 Later in 2012, Trojans were more often used to gather login and other personal 
information. In May 2012 a Trojan campaign targeting Syrian activists was reported for the 
first time. The reported Trojan was disguised as a Skype encryption tool. The tool promised to 
encrypt all Skype traffic, but instead of encrypting, the tool installed a version of DarkComet, 
a program that allows a user remote access to a computer system. Once installed, the victim 
believes that his or her Skype conversations are encrypted and secured, but in reality a threat 
actor was able to capture webcam activity, disable antivirus programs, record keystrokes, and 
to steal passwords from the computer.
118
 The use of a Trojan is more effective than phishing; 
a Trojan not only gathers login credentials, it also allows the threat actor to gather much more 
data.  
 Trojans in the Syrian war did not only appear as fake encryption tools, they also 
appeared in other disguises. For example, in August 2012 a Trojan disguised as a fake 
security tool called AntiHacker was observed. While AntiHacker promised protection against 
hackers, it installed, just like the fake Skype encryption tool, a version of DarkComet, 
allowing the threat actor remote access to the computer system.
119
 And throughout the war, 
Trojans were sometimes hidden in fake revolutionary documents and were targeted at specific 
members of the opposition. For example, in May 2012 some activists were contacted through 
Skype with the question to assist in the battle for Aleppo, accompanied by a fake PDF file 
containing more information about the plan. Opening the document would install a version of 
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DarkComet, which allows the threat actor remote access to the computer system.
120
 And also 
malware attacks through email were reported; for example, on 7 October 2013 a NGO 
administrator received an email about alleged cruelties of Assad’s military, followed by a link 
to a video. Opening the link would indeed show an atrocious video of a beheading, but in the 
background a RAT was downloaded and installed, which allowed the threat actor to log 
keystrokes and take screenshots of the host computer.
121
  
 However, phishing attempts and most kinds of Trojans were relatively easy 
recognizable. Phishing websites do generally not work properly and have an URL that is 
different from the genuine website. Trojans often have features that look suspicious to an 
observant viewer. The disguise of a Trojan – the fake tools and documents – often looks inept 
and amateurish and show signs of being illegitimate. The fake Skype encryption tool, for 
example, contained text written in Comic Sans,
122
 and the fake AntiHacker contained serious 
grammar errors.
123
 Moreover, since Syrian malware is observed, cyber security researchers 
and institutions, such as Kaspersky Lab, have warned Syrian users to be cautious with 
downloads and clicking on links.
124
 This has raised the awareness of cyber security among the 
Syrian opposition.  
 As a result of Syrian activists becoming more savvy, Syrian malware became more 
sophisticated. For example, already in May 2012 a malicious copy of Simurgh, a censorship 
circumvention tool designed for an Iranian public but also used in Syria, is found. The 
malicious copy worked appropriately like legitimate versions of Simurgh, but the copy 
contained a backdoor through which login credentials and other personal information were 
transmitted to the threat actor.
125
 Similarly, in June 2013, a malicious copy of FreeGate, 
censorship circumvention software developed for a Chinese public but also used in Syria, is 
observed. This copy was infected with a malicious implant that installed a Remote Access 
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Tool (RAT), which allowed the threat actor complete access to the victim’s computer.126 And 
in March 2014, a malicious repackaging of Psiphon, another censorship circumvention tool, 
was found. This malicious copy also contained a RAT, which allowed a threat actor to log 
keystrokes and to modify the installed firewall on the victim’s computer.127 Because the 
malicious copies of censorship circumvention tools worked properly and looked legitimate, it 
was much harder to detect this kind of malware.  
Despite the raised awareness, Syrian activists were especially vulnerable to malicious 
copies of legitimate software. Websites where official copies of censorship circumvention 
tools can be downloaded were often blocked or restricted in Syria, as well as many online 
services such as Google Play Store. One thus needed a censorship circumvention tool to 
download a censorship circumvention tool. As a result, activists got their copies via unofficial 
ways, for example from friends or via social media.
128
 Among the Syrian opposition a culture 
of sharing files, tools, and programs via social media has emerged; a hazardous development 
because threat actors could easily seed malicious files via social media and easily reach a 
broad variety of targets.
129
  
 
The dangers of social media 
Threat actors actively spread the malware through compromised social media accounts. For 
example, on 14 September 2013 a deceptive message in the Facebook group ‘Revolution 
Youth Coalition on the Syrian Coast’ was posted. The message, accompanied by a link, was 
about further information of the killing of FSA commander Abu Basir al-Adkani in July 2013, 
something that would be of interest to many Syrian activists. However, it appeared that the 
Facebook group was hijacked and that the link in the message led to a malicious RAT. 
Comments warning other Facebook users about the potential dangers of the link were 
persistently removed by the attackers.
130
 Because people trust friends and pro-opposition 
Facebook groups and because they were not aware that these accounts might be 
compromised, their computer systems were easily infected by clicking on a link coming from 
a ‘friend’. 
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 The malware that targeted the Syrian opposition was mostly of Syrian origin, 
assumingly even developed with government involvement. Most of the malware 
communicated with and sent the gathered data to command and control (C2) servers located 
in Syria, sometimes different incidents of malware were associated with the same IP 
addresses.
131
 Probably the Syrian regime was involved with the malware campaigns: there are 
several signs of government involvement. For example, some of the C2 servers remained 
online during a regime-led internet blackout in November 2012.
132
 Furthermore, the Syrian 
government was especially interested in the data gathered by the malware.  
 Though, not all the malware targeting the Syrian opposition was from Syrian origin, 
other origins were found as well. For example, on 3 October 2015 a well-connected political 
figure of the Syrian opposition received an email with malicious content and a link to a fake 
pro-opposition website containing more malicious software. The malware and the website 
showed signs of Iranian origin.
133
 And between November 2013 and January 2014 other 
threat actors, pretending to be attractive women, approached members of the Syrian 
opposition. They infected their targets by sending photos of themselves containing a 
malicious file, furthermore these fake women have posted links to malicious pro-opposition 
websites on their Facebook profiles. This malware campaign showed signs of probable 
Lebanese origin.
134
 Despite the Iranian and Lebanese traces, it is not exactly known who these 
actors were.  
 Research has shown that malware campaigns targeting the Syrian opposition come 
from four different threat actors. Besides Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese links, also ISIS 
affiliated groups carried out malware attacks on the Syrian opposition. In 2014, ISIS critics of 
the group ‘Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently’ (RSS) received an email with malicious 
content. The malware did not contain a RAT, but it sent the victim’s location to an email 
address. This method does not need an available C2 server at any time, which is useful in a 
situation of interrupted internet connectivity.
135
 In terms of design, modus operandi, location 
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of the C2 servers and selection of the targets, the malware campaigns were significantly 
different from each other; on this basis four main threat actors could thus be distinguished.
136
  
 Although different threat actors were involved with the malware attacks, the majority 
of the malware attacks was of Syrian origin. In a period between 2012 and 2014 more than 60 
unique malware campaigns with Syrian roots have been detected.
137
 Despite the traces to 
Syria, it is hard to determine who exactly was responsible for these campaigns. Some attribute 
the malware attacks to the SEA, while others claim that the Syrian Malware Team, a group 
affiliated to the SEA, was responsible.
138
 John Scott-Railton and Morgan Marquis-Boire, 
researchers focusing on cyber threats who did a lot of research on Syrian malware, rather 
speak of Pro-Government Electronic Actors, among whom the SEA.
139
  
 The Syrian malware attacks targeting the Syrian opposition served mainly as an 
extended form of internet censorship. When people came to learn about online protection 
measures, it became more difficult for the regime to monitor the opposition. By 
compromising social media accounts the regime found a new way to keep an eye on the 
activists. The hijacking of social media accounts was thus not only meant to disrupt the 
communication of the opposition, it also served to spread malware and thereby to spy on the 
opposition. In this context, the SEA also contributed to the sphere of distrust by attacking the 
category of communication services.   
 
Causing fear and distrust  
The cyber attacks of the SEA on communication services were primarily meant to make the 
opposition mistrustful of using these services, for example by threatening to leak their data to 
the Syrian government. On 20 July 2013 the SEA hacked into the systems of Tango, a chat 
application that allows users to communicate through 3G or Wi-Fi networks and provides a 
more powerful security. This app is popular among people living under authoritarian regimes 
because it allows them to circumvent internet censorship. With the cyber attacks, the SEA 
claimed to have obtained millions of email addresses and telephone numbers of Tango users. 
Furthermore, the SEA announced that it would pass the information to the Syrian government, 
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a move that could potentially bring people into problems if the data breach was serious.
140
 A 
few days earlier something similar happened. On 16 July 2013 the SEA attacked TrueCaller, a 
phone directory application, and claimed to have captured several databases with hundreds of 
millions of names, phone numbers, and login credentials of millions of Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn and Gmail accounts. The SEA furthermore stated that it had sent the information to 
the Syrian government.
141
  
 To cause more distrust the SEA also accused services of spying for the government. 
For example, on 1 January 2014, the SEA hijacked the Twitter and Facebook accounts of 
Skype, Microsoft’s instant messaging and video chat application, and accused Microsoft of 
spying for governments. On Skype’s Twitter account the SEA posted the message: “Stop 
spying on people! Via Syrian Electronic Army @Official_SEA16 #SEA cc @FBIPressOffice 
(...)” and on Facebook the SEA posted the message: “Don’t use Microsoft emails 
(hotmail,outlook), They are monitoring your accounts and selling the data to the governments. 
More details soon. #SEA.”142 Ten days later, on 11 January 2014, the SEA hijacked the 
Twitter account of Microsoft News, and posted a similar message.
143
  
 To cause even more distrust in using popular communication services, the SEA 
accused services of spying for Israel. On 23 July 2013 the SEA defaced the help desk website 
of Viber, an Israel-based instant messaging application. In the message on the defaced 
webpage they denounced Viber as a spying tool for the Israeli intelligence services, a horrible 
idea for many Syrians because of the rivalries between Syria and Israel. To provide evidence 
for their claim, the SEA included a screenshot of a hacked Viber system and included a list of 
names of Viber administrators and their Israeli telephone numbers, see the message below:
144
 
Dear All Viber Users, 
The Israeli-based “Viber” is spying and tracking you 
We weren’t able to hack all Viber Systems, but most of it is designed for spying and tracking 
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Screenshot of a hacked system: 
(...) 
The Phone numbers of Viber administrators: 
(...) 
Some backups were downloaded successfully, 
SEA was here, 
 However, the threats of leaking data and the accusations of spying were probably a 
bluff, only meant to discourage the opposition from using the popular communication 
services. The targeted communication services, like Skype, Tango and Viber, were services 
that were frequently used in the Middle East, especially by the Syrian opposition.
145
 The 
services are foreign-based and offer a good protection of privacy; communication through 
these services was therefore hard to monitor by the Syrian regime, especially in combination 
with a censorship circumvention tool. It was thus in the regime’s interests to deter the 
opposition from using these services. However, the threats and accusations were probably not 
true. The companies themselves admit that there were small breaches into their systems, but 
they denied that personal data was leaked.
146
 Moreover, the SEA did not provide sufficient 
evidence for their claim: they did not even show a tip of the captured data, and the contact 
information of the Viber administrators did not prove any spying activities by Israel.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I wanted to answer the question: why has the SEA attacked communication 
services? To find an answer I have analyzed messages leaved by the SEA on defaced 
webpages and messages on other online platforms, and I have placed these messages in the 
context of malware campaigns targeting the Syrian opposition. My analysis has shown that 
the cyber attacks of the SEA were especially meant to deter the opposition from using these 
services. By threatening to leak personal data to the Syrian regime and by accusing the 
services of spying, the SEA tried to make the opposition mistrustful of using these services.  
 The cyber attacks on the communication services should be placed in the context of 
malware campaigns targeting the Syrian opposition. The use of malicious software, spread via 
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social media, was a new way for the Syrian regime to spy on the opposition. Malware made it 
possible to gather login credentials of social media accounts and to see what a victim was 
doing online. The malware functioned thereby as an extended form of internet censorship. 
The cyber attacks on the communication services also contributed to this extended form of 
censorship. Activists were deterred from using these services by the false threats and 
accusations. Both the malware campaigns and the cyber attacks on communication services 
contributed to a sphere of fear and distrust in cyberspace.  
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Chapter 4: Hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army 
While the malware campaigns served a clear war objective, the objective of cyber attacks on 
media is less evident. Cyber attacks on media did not directly affect any of the actors in the 
Syrian war. Yet, the category of media was the most important target of the SEA in both the 
second and third phases of the war. Especially in 2013, the SEA terrified (Western) news 
organizations with a wave of cyber attacks. How was this wave related to the Syrian war? and 
what was its purpose? In this chapter I will find an answer to the question: why did the SEA 
primarily attack media? Just as in the previous two chapters, I will answer this question by 
analysing the messages on defaced webpages and on other online platforms.  
 
Posting fake news 
As we have seen in the first chapter, the SEA was in the first phase primarily focussed on 
retaliating Anonymous. But in 2012, after quite a long time of no cyber activity, the SEA 
developed a new strategy: targeting media. As we have seen in chapter 1, there basically were 
two waves of cyber attacks on media by the SEA: the heaviest one in the spring and summer 
of 2013 and another wave in 2014. But the first targeted news organizations were already 
attacked in 2012 and were regional news organizations: Qatar-based al-Jazeera and Saudi-
based al-Arabiya. From this point on, the SEA started regularly attacking media, and these 
cyber attacks show a development over the course of the war.  
In the first phase, the SEA attacked websites of regional news organizations and their 
social media accounts to spread fake news or to accuse them of spreading fake news. On 29 
January 2012, the SEA’s first attack on a news organization, the SEA defaced al-Jazeera’s 
Syria Live Blog with a photo of a self-assured Assad in a military uniform before a Syrian 
flag. The SEA stated on its own website that al-Jazeera was attacked because it would spread 
“false and fabricated news” to “ignite sedition” among the Syrian people to achieve the goals 
of “Washington and Tel Aviv.”147 On 24 March the SEA hijacked the English Facebook page 
of the news organization al-Arabiya. The SEA posted fake news in Arabic about clashes 
between the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian regime security forces. Furthermore, the SEA 
accused al-Arabiya of broadcasting venomous, Brotherhood, and Zionist thoughts in the Arab 
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world.
148
 A month later, on 23 April, the SEA hit al-Arabiya again. On the hijacked Twitter 
and Facebook accounts the SEA posted fake news in Arabic about an explosion and a coup in 
Qatar, an explosion in the Syrian city of Tartus, and about an international observer who got 
shot in the Syrian city of Homs.
149
  
 Spreading fake news through hacked news websites was particularly meant to 
influence the opinion of people in the region. The attacked news organizations are both based 
in the Middle East and primarily address an Arab speaking public. This same public was also 
addressed by the SEA: despite the English Facebook page, all the fake news stories were 
written in Arabic. The fake news stories were an attempt to spread a Syrian perspective of the 
revolution to a broader public and to reduce the influence of the critical stance of the news 
organizations towards the Syrian regime. The SEA denigrated the news organizations and 
portrayed them as supportive of terrorism and as biased in favour of the West and Israel, 
which would drive the Arab world apart. While influencing regional opinions seems a 
functioning approach, the SEA did not continue with it.  
 In the second phase, the SEA started attacking Western-based media; a significant 
difference because another, much broader, public was addressed. Although a broader public 
was reached by targeting Western media, the SEA initially continued with spreading fake 
news about the region. On 3 August 2012 the SEA compromised the blogging platform of 
news agency Reuters and posted false news about the battle for Aleppo. According to a 
fabricated interview with Riad al-Asaad, a commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the 
SFA would withdraw from Aleppo and other major cities because of heavy losses and internal 
wrangling. Then, at secret bases, they would re-coordinate under supervision of Turkey and 
Israeli intelligence services. Furthermore, the SFA would have required Gaddafi’s chemical 
weapons.
150
 Two days later, at 5 August, the SEA hijacked Reuter’s Twitter account and 
posted fictitiously that 2200 of the SFA fighters had been killed in Aleppo and that the victory 
of the Syrian security forces was near.
151
 These fake messages were posted in English and 
were meant to denigrate the Syrian opposition to a broader (Western) public.  
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 The fake news that the SEA has posted is not just another perspective of true events, 
but are completely fabricated news stories. This means that the hacking of news organizations 
and the posting of the fake news is more than only a PR stunt. Ahmed al-Rawi, who has 
analysed the cyber attacks of the SEA as well, argues that the SEA was used as a PR tool by 
the Syrian government. Since the beginning of the revolution, the Syrian government had 
difficulties with spreading its own perspective of the situation to the rest of the world. By far 
the most news organizations in the West were very critical about the acts of the Syrian regime 
and had a stance more in favour of the Syrian opposition. By hacking news organizations and 
by posting fake news stories, the Syrian regime is able to express its views to a broader public 
abroad.
152
 However, by posting completely fabricated news, expressing its own views would 
not be effective either.  
 Rather, by hacking the news organizations’ websites and social media accounts and by 
posting fake news on these platforms, the SEA is making a statement. Since the beginning of 
the revolution, Western media published critically about the Syrian regime; they do, for 
example, not mention pro-Assad demonstrations or the assassination of Syrian soldiers and 
other atrocities by the FSA. The stance of the Western media was therefore by the Syrian 
regime perceived as biased and would only incite more agitation. In an interview on the 
Lebanese TV channel al-Mayadeen in 2013, a member of the SEA said that the media were 
inciting violence.
153
 By posting fake news, the SEA made the statement that the news 
organizations spread fake news and that these organizations cannot be trusted.  
 The statement that the Western news organizations are untrustworthy was emphasized 
by posting obvious, or even ridiculous, fake news. This could be clearly illustrated by the 
hijacking of the BBC Weather’s Twitter account. On 21 March 2013 the SEA hijacked the 
Twitter account of the BBC Weather and posted ridiculous fake weather forecasts for the 
Middle East. For example, the SEA posted the following tweets: “Saudi weather station down 
due to head-on collision with camel,” “Chaotic weather forecast for Lebanon as the 
government decides to distance itself from the Milky Way,” “Tsunami alert for Haifa: 
Residents are advised to return to Poland,” “Scandal: Edinburgh storm warning station 
decommissioned after maintenance fund diverted to arming Syrian opposition,” “Hazardous 
fog warning for North Syria: Erdogan orders terrorists to launch chemical weapons at civilian 
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areas.” And finally the SEA added: “Thank for hanging out with us! To know the truth about 
the global terrorist war on #Syria, follow @Official_SEA #SEA.”154  
 The fake news that the SEA had posted is not only bizarre and obviously fake, it also 
contained a political message. The ridiculous weather forecasts made especially fun of the 
state actors, such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Turkey, which support the Syrian opposition. 
In other tweets sent by the SEA, also Western powers were made ludicrous. For example, on 
25 May 2013 the SEA hijacked the Twitter account of ITV News and had sent the following 
tweets: “Scotland yard: Cleaver used in #Woolwich murder case linked to aid sent by MI6 to 
Syrian rebels on Hague’s orders,” “Cameron cuts education funding, triples aid to Syrian 
rebels: “Israel’s long security is the UK’s first priority”,” “Francois Hollande to double aid to 
rebels, including a complementary French flag with every aid package.”155 The fake news 
messages depicted the states that support the Syrian opposition as foolish and stupid. Though, 
none of the fake stories had such an impact as the fake news about the explosions at the White 
House in the AP hack in April 2013.  
  
SEA was here 
During the peak of the first wave of the SEA’s cyber attacks in the summer of 2013, the act of 
hacking news organizations became more important than spreading ridiculous fake news. In 
most cases, the SEA did not even send fake news. At most of the hijacked Twitter accounts, 
only the message “SEA was here” was left, which was apparently enough to make its 
statement. Just by hacking so many news websites, the SEA had become notorious among the 
news organizations and generated thereby already media attention. To be effective, the SEA 
did thus not need to make up fake news stories every time; it could save time by only 
claiming responsibility for the attack. The amount of cyber attacks became thus more 
important than the quality of the cyber attacks and the conspicuousness of the fake news 
stories.  
At the end of the summer of 2013, the SEA had cultivated a new and more 
sophisticated method to affect multiple websites at once. At 17 August 2013 the SEA hacked 
into the systems of Outbrain, a company that increases web traffic for online publishers, and 
redirected the visitors of specific webpages to the website of the SEA. The news companies 
                                                          
154
 Graham Cluley, “BBC Weather’s Twitter account is hijacked by Syrian Electronic Army,” Sophos, March 21, 
2013, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/21/bbc-weather-twitter-account-hackedsyrian-electronic-army/. 
155
 Graham Cluley, “IVT London hacked on Twitter. Syrian Electronic Army strikes again,” Graham Cluley, 
May 25, 2013, https://www.grahamcluley.com/itv-london-hacked-on-twitter-syrian-electronic-army-strikes-
again/. 
58 
 
that were affected by this hack were The Washington Post, CNN, and Time.
156
 And at 28 
August 2013 the SEA hacked into the systems of Melbourne IT, an Australian domain 
registrar, and changed the name servers of several news websites to its own name server. 
Thereby, the web traffic to the websites of the New York Times, The Huffington Post, and the 
website of Twitter was redirected to the website of the SEA.
157
 These kinds of DNS (Domain 
Name System) attacks allow the SEA to affect multiple websites at once, a method that the 
SEA continued during the third phase.  
 In the third phase, during the SEA’s second wave of cyber attacks, the SEA’s strategy 
of attacking media changed again: the SEA no longer posted fake news stories. Instead, the 
SEA developed a more straightforward and aggressive, maybe even activist, approach of 
accusing news organizations of spreading fake news. On 23 January 2014 the SEA hijacked 
the Twitter account of the CNN. Instead of a ridiculous fake news story or a simple ‘SEA was 
here,’ the SEA extended the messages and posted: “Syrian Electronic Army Was Here... Stop 
lying... All your reports are fake!”158 And on 23 June 2014 the SEA targeted news agency 
Reuters again. All traffic to Reuter’s website was directed to a defacement page with a 
message accusing Reuters of publishing fake news and accusing the UK government of 
supporting terrorists:
159
  
Hacked by Syrian Electronic Army 
 
Stop publishing fake reports and false articles about Syria! 
 
UK government is supporting the terrorists in Syria to destroy it, Stop spreading its 
propaganda. 
 The SEA not only took offence at negative news about the Syrian regime, they also 
heavily reacted to insults at the SEA itself. When Ira Winkler, the security expert who gave a 
presentation about the Syrian Electronic Army at the RSA Conference, stated that their cyber 
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attacks were stupid and said that they were the “cockroaches of the internet,”160 the SEA 
responded fiercely. On 29 April 2014, two months after the presentation (probably the SEA 
did not notice the video earlier), the SEA attacked the website of the RSA Conference and 
redirected all traffic to a defacement page. The defacement page showed a message in which 
the SEA threatened Ira Winkler and called him a cockroach:
161
  
Hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army 
Dear Ira winkler, 
Do you think you are funny? Do you think you are secure? 
You are NOT 
If there is a COCKROACH in the internet it would be definitely you 
Your friends at SEA 
And on 7 May 2014 the SEA insulted Ira Winkler again when they hijacked the Twitter 
accounts of the Wall Street Journal. The SEA posted the message “@Irawinkler is a 
cockroach,” accompanied by a picture of Winkler’s head on the body of a cockroach.162 
Remarkably, the Wall Street Journal had nothing to do with the presentation of Ira Winkler, 
this target seems therefore chosen randomly.  
However, most of the cyber attacks on media were targeted because the news website 
was critical about the Assad regime. In the course of the third phase, the SEA not just accused 
media of publishing fake news, they also became more threatening and fierce in their 
messages. On 17 December 2014 the SEA attacked the International Business Times and 
deleted a news story that was, according to the SEA, embarrassing to the Assad regime. The 
specific article was about a decline of the armed forces of Assad, based on a report of the 
Institute for the Study of War.
163
 However, the SEA stated that the article was based on false 
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information about Syria, it deleted the article and threatened that it would delete the entire 
website next time:
164
 
Hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army. 
This time we only deleted the article that content false information about Syria and the Syrian 
army.  
Next time, we will delete all your website. 
 In some cases the messages of the SEA were outright shocking. On 20 January 2015, 
barely two weeks after the terror attack on the editors of the French satirical weekly Charlie 
Hebdo on 7 January, the SEA hijacked the Twitter account of the French newspaper Le 
Monde. Among other messages, the SEA posted “Je ne suis pas Charlie,” French for “I am not 
Charlie.” The message intended to horrify a mourning France after the impactful terror attack. 
The sentence is a reference to the slogan “Je suis Charlie” (I am Charlie) that, after the terror 
attack, symbolized the condemnation of violence against the media and the support of 
freedom of speech. On its own Twitter account, the SEA claimed responsibility for the cyber 
attack and stated that they condemn terrorism in France, but that the newspaper Le Monde and 
the French government supported terrorism.
165
 This cyber attack has some similarities with 
the damaging false flag operation against TV5 Monde in April 2015 when a message “Je 
suisIS” (I am IS) was posted.48 Though, the cyber attack at Le Monde was claimed by the 
SEA and is, in terms of style and method, similar to other attacks of the SEA.  
Although the SEA’s cyber attacks have become more threatening in the third phase of 
the war, the intention never was to cause real damage. Defaced webpages and affected name 
servers were easily restored, hijacked accounts were easily regained and false massages were 
easily removed. The SEA even apologized for the defacement of the website of the University 
of California: “we are sorry to destroy your sites.”102 The damage on the stock markets after 
the AP hack seems unintentional: the SEA could never have predicted the consequences of 
their fake news message on the stock market. Moreover, the SEA could have caused more 
damage if they wanted to. By hijacking the social media accounts of big news organizations, 
the SEA had access to a big audience. They could have caused more damage if they had sent 
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viruses or malware to the millions of followers, or if they had posted more credible fake news 
stories to cause more turmoil in society. The cyber attacks on the media were thus rather 
meant to make a statement than to cause damage.   
 
The real enemy 
According to the Syrian Electronic Army itself, the reason that they attacked media was 
because the war in Syria is actually a media war. In the interview at al-Mayadeen, the 
Lebanese TV channel, a member of the SEA explains that the conflict in Syria is incited by 
the international media. The media agitated people by sending biased news stories critical of 
Syria, causing unrests and uprisings. The SEA considers the Western media thus as the source 
of the Syrian war. According to the SEA, the most effective way to fight back is by using the 
same weapons as the media enemy. By sending messages with another perspective of the 
situation to a large public, the SEA hopes to influence opinions about Syria and to lessen the 
agitation and unrests in the county. Because the SEA’s intention was not to cause damage or 
to gain financial profit, but only to reduce violence, they asserted that they pursued a noble 
cause.
166
  
 Although the SEA had predominantly attacked media, they stated that their main 
target is the Israeli enemy. This is surprising because this is not visible in the network analysis 
that I have done in the first chapter. The SEA has attacked several Israeli websites, but these 
were not significant compared to all their other cyber attacks. In the same interview at al-
Mayadeen, the SEA member admitted that the war had determined and prioritized other 
targets, but from the beginning Israel has been their primary target. When the war has come to 
an end, they will concentrate on the ‘real enemy,’ which, according to the SEA, will be very 
disruptive.
167
  
 However, the SEA never managed to reach the end of the war; at the end of 2015 the 
group suddenly disappeared from cyberspace. The last cyber attack of the SEA was on 8 June 
2015 at the official website of the US army. They left the message “Your commanders admit 
they are training the people they have sent you to die fighting,”168 probably to discourage new 
recruits from joining the US army. This attack did not give any sign why the SEA stopped 
                                                          
166
 TheHairyHeart, “Interview with The Syrian Electronic Army,” filmed 2013, broadcasted by al-Mayadeen, 
video, 49:48, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OR6v_cd_XhY. 
167
 Ibid.  
168
 Sean Gallagher, “US Army website defaced by Syrian Electronic Army [Updated],” Ars Technica, June 8, 
2015, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/06/us-army-website-defaced-by-syrian-electronic-
army/. 
62 
 
carrying out cyber attacks. The SEA remained active on its Twitter account until December 
2015, posting messages on the development of the war, but it said nothing about why they had 
stopped their cyber activities. Perhaps the SEA found it too risky to continue.  
 A few months later, in March 2016, the FBI, the intelligence and security service of 
the US, revealed the identities of the main SEA members. The FBI already investigated the 
SEA since the first wave of cyber attacks in 2013 because of the potential harm that they 
could do on American society. The FBI revealed their identities in order to arrest and 
prosecute them. The Pr0’s real name appeared to be Ahmed al-Agha, a man from Damascus, 
born in 1994.
169
 The Pr0 was thus just 17 years old at the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 
2011. The FBI also revealed the identity of The Shadow: a man named Firas Dardar, born in 
1989, from Homs.
170
 Both men are suspected of, among other things, unauthorized access to 
and damage of computers, and of conveying false information regarding a terrorist attack; for 
both men the FBI offers an award of $100.000 for the information leading to their arrest.  
 And in September 2016, another member of the SEA was convicted of involvement 
with the SEA’s cyber operations. Prior to the published identities of al-Agha and Dardar, 
Peter Romar, a 37-year-old man, was arrested in Germany. In September 2016, in a US court 
Romar pleaded guilty to charges of illegal access to computers in his role as member of the 
SEA.
171
 While I cannot prove it, I assume that months before his arrest the SEA members 
must have felt that the FBI was behind them and that they needed to be more careful. After a 
period of keeping themselves low-profile, the arrest of Romar and the disclosure of the 
identities of al-Agha and Dardar must have meant the definite end to the SEA’s cyber 
operations.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to answer the question why the SEA primarily attacked Western media. 
I have done this by analyzing the messages on targeted websites. My analysis shows that the 
cyber attacks on Western media were primarily meant to influence opinions about Syria. In 
the perspective of the SEA and the Syrian regime, Western media are biased and they spread 
fake news about Syria. The media thereby incite people and aggravate the situation. By 
posting obvious and even ridiculous fake news on the news websites and social media 
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accounts, the SEA tried to denigrate the credibility of these news organizations and to reduce 
their inciting effect. 
 In the course of the war, the cyber attacks on the media show a development. Initially, 
the SEA focused on spreading fake news to a local public, and in the second phase the SEA 
started addressing a broader international public. A more significant change happened later in 
the second phase and in the third phase: the SEA no longer posted fake news. Instead of 
spending time on fabricating news stories, the SEA targeted more websites and simply 
accused them of publishing fake news. This indicates that the SEA rather wanted to make its 
point about the news regarding Syria, than really to influence people or to cause confusion or 
damage.  
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Discussion 
The cyber attacks of the SEA and of other cyber actors did not stand on their own; they were 
related to the course of the war. In the course of the war, the SEA showed differences in the 
targets that they selected, in the type of cyber attacks that they carried out, and in the 
messages that they left on defaced webpages and on hijacked social media accounts. These 
differences were related to specific events and developments in the civil war. For example, in 
the first phase, characterized by real world protests against the Syrian regime, various 
hacktivist movements attacked the cyber assets of the Syrian government. The hacktivists 
supported thereby the Syrian activists. This shows a direct relation between the revolution and 
the hacktivist activities. Most of the cyber attacks of the SEA in this period were a response to 
the hacktivism of, among others, Anonymous.  
 In the beginning of the second phase, malware campaigns frequently targeted Syrian 
opposition members, which coincided with the advancement of the Free Syrian Army. The 
second phase was characterized by escalation of the violence and, especially in the beginning 
of this period, by the success of the opposition. This development led to changes in 
cyberspace: besides regional actors becoming more active, malware tactics were more often 
deployed. Malware attacks targeting the opposition occurred during the entire war, but most 
frequently in the period of the opposition’s advancement.  
 In the same phase, international media got more attention for the Syrian civil war, 
which coincided with the SEA’s cyber attacks on Western media. Initially, the SEA focussed 
on regional media and published fake news to address a regional public. But in the second 
phase, when the uprising became more violent and the international media got more attention 
for Syria, the SEA started attacking international media. In the spring and summer of 2013 the 
wave of cyber attacks on Western media was on its height. Although my research did not 
investigate what exactly triggered the SEA to attack media, it is evident that there is a relation 
between media attention for the Syrian civil war and the wave of cyber attacks on media.  
 When, in the third phase, the media focused on the rise of ISIS, there was less need for 
the SEA to spread fake news through hacked news websites. Remarkably, the SEA did 
continue with attacking media, but less frequent and with other messages. No longer fake 
news was posted, instead, the messages on defaced webpages became more accusing and 
threatening. In this phase, several pro-ISIS cyber actors appeared in cyberspace as well, but 
there was no interplay between the SEA and ISIS. This indicates that ISIS was not a cyber 
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threat to Syria. In the fourth phase, which is characterized by Russian intervention and 
advancement of the Syrian regime, pro-ISIS cyber actors became the most important actors 
while the SEA completely disappeared from cyberspace. See timeline below for an overview 
of the cyber operations.  
Figure 7: Timeline cyber operations in the Syrian civil war 
  From these observations some interesting patterns can be distinguished. In the second 
phase, when the Syrian regime suffered heavy losses, the cyber conflict was most vivid. 
Especially cyber operations supporting the Syrian regime, such as malware campaigns and the 
wave of cyber attacks on media, frequently occurred in this phase. Also the SEA was most 
active and most visible in this period. But some broader patterns can be drawn as well. The 
hacktivist movements became active when the security forces violently tried to suppress the 
uprisings, and the pro-ISIS cyber actors became most active when the influence and territory 
of ISIS diminished. These observations show that non-state cyber actors become more active 
when the real world political cause that they support is suffering.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper I wanted to research the role of non-state cyber actors in violent conflicts. Non-
state cyber actors seem to play a bigger role in cyber conflicts than often is thought, but their 
role is not yet well understood. In my paper I have focussed on the case of the Syrian 
Electronic Army, a Syrian hacker group supporting the Assad regime. The SEA is an 
interesting case because its cyber operations are not self-explanatory. In a period between 
2012 and 2015, the SEA carried out lots of cyber attacks, predominantly on Western media. 
However, the targets seemed unrelated to the Syrian war and the cyber attacks did not cause 
much harm; damage was easily restored and fake news stories were easily removed. These 
cyber attacks seem therefore stupid: much effort for nothing. While the attacks seemed stupid 
to a Western public, the SEA operated in the context of the Syrian war and probably had a 
bigger strategy. To understand the behaviour of the SEA, I had the following research 
question: how are the cyber attacks of the SEA related to the Syrian war?  
 To answer this question I first wanted to know who the main cyber actors were in the 
cyber dimension of the Syrian conflict. Therefore, I have made a network analysis in which I 
have analyzed all cyber attacks related to the Syrian war. From this analysis I could determine 
who the main cyber actors were and what targets they have attacked. According to my 
network analysis, the SEA was particularly active in the second and third phases of the war, 
predominantly attacking media. In the first phase the SEA was still marginal and responded to 
the cyber attacks of several hacktivist movements. The hacktivist movements, such as 
Anonymous who was the main cyber actor in the first phase, attacked assets of the Syrian 
regime in support for the Syrian activists. In the fourth phase, pro-ISIS cyber actors gained 
momentum, while the SEA completely disappeared from cyberspace.  
 Before I could examine the SEA’s cyber attacks, I first needed to know what the SEA 
was and how it has emerged. In the second chapter I have explained that the SEA was a 
hacking group of individuals who supported the Syrian regime. While the SEA openly 
supported the Syrian regime and while some relations were found, there was no official 
connection between the SEA and the Syrian government. The SEA initially attacked 
opposition websites and hijacked Facebook accounts of opposition members, but the SEA 
became more visible when it responded to the hacktivism of, among others, Anonymous. 
After the hacktivist campaign ‘OpSyria,’ the SEA developed its own strategy and carried out 
more notorious cyber attacks.  
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 A striking target of the SEA was the category of communication services. The cyber 
attacks on communication services should be seen in the context of malware campaigns 
targeting the Syrian opposition. The malware attacks against opposition members functioned 
as an extended form of censorship. Since blocking and monitoring the internet were no longer 
effective because of the use of censorship circumvention tools, malware is used to spy on the 
opposition. The targeted communication services were services often used by the Syrian 
opposition because of their good privacy and security. In the messages on the targeted 
communication services, the SEA accused them of spying, thereby deterring the opposition 
from using these services. The malware campaigns and the attacks on communication services 
both contributed to an online ambience of fear and distrust.  
 But the most important target of the SEA was the media. I have shown in my analysis 
that there were two waves of cyber attacks on media critical about the Syrian regime. In the 
first wave, in the second phase, the cyber attacks on critical media focussed on spreading fake 
news. The fake news was obviously fake and often had a ridiculous connotation. The 
messages behind these postings insinuated that the targeted news organizations spread fake 
news and could not be trusted. In the second wave of cyber attacks, in the third phase, the 
SEA did not attack the media as frequent as in the first wave and did not post fake news. The 
messages that the SEA posted during this wave were rather accusing and threatening, but still 
meant to denigrate critical media. The critical media were by the SEA considered as biased 
against Syria and as the origin of the agitation of the opposition. The cyber attacks against the 
media were thus meant to reduce incitement against the Syrian regime.  
 The cyber attacks of the SEA were thus not targeted against the West specifically; the 
cyber attacks affecting Western organizations were rather meant to influence and control the 
Syrian opposition. By trying to cause fear and distrust and by trying to denigrate international 
media, the SEA hoped to weaken or to restrain the opposition. This shows that cyber tactics 
do not need to cause damage to be effective and do not need to be technically sophisticated to 
be effective. The purpose of influencing people to establish a certain mindset by simply 
sending political messages might even be more effective than only causing (digital) damage. 
By influencing human minds, crowds of people could be incited with more detrimental 
effects. Given the limited abilities of non-state cyber actors, such as limited funds and no 
access to intelligence, it is likely that non-state cyber actors in general tend to focus on 
influencing people rather than damaging digital systems and structures.  
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This research furthermore shows that non-state cyber actors become more loyal to the 
political cause that they support when the situation is most pressing. The SEA became more 
active in carrying out cyber attacks in the periods when the Syrian regime lost territory on the 
real world battlefield. This pattern is also visible by other non-state cyber actors. These cyber 
operations are thus not led or initiated by a state actor, but it is likely that a state actor, 
especially when it suffers a defeat, will not discourage these supporting cyber attacks. 
Moreover, while it is often assumed that non-state cyber actors are hard to research because of 
their uncertain agenda, my research has shown that in conflict situations non-state cyber 
actors adhere to the political cause that they support, whereby they have a more reliable 
agenda.  
69 
 
Bibliography 
Acharya, Amitav. “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds. An Agenda for 
International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014): 647-659. 
Albanesius, Cloe. “Internet Access in Syria Goes Down Amidst Protests.” PCMag, June 3, 2011. 
https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386369,00.asp. 
Al-Jazeera. “Activists take battle for Syria online.” al-Jazeera, September 26, 2011. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/201192692416534215.html. 
Allhof, Fritz, Adam Henschke and Bradley Jay Strawser, ed. Binary Bullets: The Ethics of 
Cyberwarfare. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Al-Rawi, Ahmed K. “Cyber Warriors in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army.” 
Public Relations Review, 40 (2014): 420-428. 
Al-Saqaf, Walid. “Internet Censorship Circumvention Tools: Escaping the Control of the Syrian 
Regime.” Media and Communication, 4, no. 1 (2016): 39-50. 
Aouragh, Miriyam. “Framing the Internet in the Arab Revolutions: Myth Meets Modernity.” Cinema 
Journal, 52, no. 1 (2012): 148-156. 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!” RAND Corporation, 1993. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP223.html. 
Baiazy, Amjad. “Syria’s Cyber Wars.” Academia.edu. 
www.academia.edu/3555530/Syria_Cyber_Wars. 
BBC. “Hackers attack several BBC Twitter accounts.” BBC, March 21, 2013.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21879230. 
Booth, Robert, Mona Mahmood and Luke Harding. “Exclusive: secret Assad emails lift lid on life of 
leader’s inner circle.” The Guardian, March 14, 2012. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/assad-emails-lift-lid-inner-circle. 
Business Today. “Truecaller confirms database was hacked, says investigation on.” Business Today, 
July 19, 2013. https://www.businesstoday.in/technology/news/truecaller-database-hacked-
confirmed-investigation-on/story/197016.html. 
Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications.” Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 24, no. 1 (2013): 1-11. 
Cluley, Graham. “BBC Weather’s Twitter account is hijacked by Syrian Electronic Army.” Sophos, 
March 21, 2013. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/21/bbc-weather-twitter-account-
hackedsyrian-electronic-army/. 
Cluley, Graham. “IVT London hacked on Twitter. Syrian Electronic Army strikes again.” Graham 
Cluley, May 25, 2013. https://www.grahamcluley.com/itv-london-hacked-on-twitter-syrian-
electronic-army-strikes-again/. 
70 
 
Cluley, Graham. “The Syrian Electronic Army Strikes Again! International Business Times Hacked.” 
Tripwire, December 18, 2014. https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-
protection/the-syrian-electronic-army-strikes-again-international-business-times-hacked/. 
Coleman, Gabriella. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy; The Many Faces of Anonymous. London: 
Verso, 2014. 
Collier, Kevin. “The Telegraph hacked: “Syrian Electronic Army was here”.” The Daily Dot, May 20. 
2013. https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/telegraph-hacked-sea-syrian-electronic-army/. 
Council on Foreign Relations. “Compromise of TV5 Monde.” Digital and Cyberspace Policy 
Program. Accessed June 13, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/compromise-
tv5-monde. 
Council on Foreign Relations. “Our Methodology.” Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program. Accessed 
June 13, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations#OurMethodology. 
Crook, Jordan. “Viber Attacked By Syrian Electronic Army.” TechCrunch, July 23, 2013. 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/07/23/viber-attacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/. 
Daudi. “FBI labels Syrian Electronic Army as terrorist organization.” HackRead, September 9, 2013. 
https://www.hackread.com/fbi-labels-syrian-electronic-army-as-terrorist-organization/. 
E Hacking News. “Al Arabiya’s Twitter & Facebook accounts hacked by Syrian Electronic Army.” E 
Hacking News, April 25, 2012. http://www.ehackingnews.com/2012/04/al-arabiyas-twitter-
facebook-accounts.html. 
E Hacking News. “SocialFlow hacked, New York Post Facebook and twitter accounts hacked.” E 
Hacking News, August 13, 2013. http://www.ehackingnews.com/2013/08/socialflow-hacked-
new-york-post.html. 
E Hacking News. “Syrian Electronic Army hacks 4 Wall Street Journal twitter accounts.” E Hacking 
News, May 7, 2014. http://www.ehackingnews.com/2014/05/syrian-electronic-army-hacks-4-
wall.html. 
Farwell, James P. and Rafal Rohozinski, “The New Reality of Cyber War.” Survival, 54, no. 4 (2012): 
107-120. 
FBI. “Ahmed Al Agha.” Most Wanted. Accessed July 20, 2018. 
https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/ahmed-al-agha. 
FBI. “Firas Dardar.” Most Wanted. Accessed July 20, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/firas-
dardar. 
Fisher, Max. “Syrian hackers claim AP hack  that tipped stock market by $136 billion. Is it terrorism?” 
The Washington Post, April 23, 2013. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-
hack-that-tipped-stock-market-by-136-billion-is-it-
terrorism/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0d061d176bcd. 
71 
 
Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “How a Teenage Hacker Became the Target of a US Drone Strike.” 
Vice, August 28, 2015. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jp5wed/junaid-hussain-isis-
hacker-drone. 
Gallagher, Sean. “Pro-government hactivists deface Al Jazeera coverage of Syrian violence.” Ars 
Technica, January 29, 2012. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/pro-government-
hactivists-deface-al-jazeera-coverage-of-syrian-violence/. 
Gallagher, Sean. “US Army website defaced by Syrian Electronic Army [Updated].” Ars Technica, 
June 8, 2015. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/06/us-army-website-defaced-
by-syrian-electronic-army/. 
Galperin, Eva and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “New Wave of Facebook Phishing Attacks Targets Syrian 
Activists.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, April 24, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/new-wave-facebook-phishing-attacks-targets-syrian-
activists. 
Galperin, Eva, and Jillian C. York. “Syria Goes Dark.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 29, 
2012. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/syria-goes-dark. 
Galperin, Eva, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “Fake Skype Encryption Tool Targeted at Syrian Activists 
Promises Security, Delivers Spyware.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 2, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/fake-skype-encryption-tool-targeted-syrian-activists-
promises-security-delivers. 
Galperin, Eva, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “Fake YouTube Site Targets Syrian Activists With 
Malware.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, March 15, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/fake-youtube-site-targets-syrian-activists-malware. 
Galperin, Eva, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “Pro-Syrian Government Hackers Target Activists With 
Fake Anti-Hacking Tool.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 15, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/syrian-malware-post. 
Galperin, Eva, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “The Internet is Back in Syria and So is Malware 
Targeting Syrian Activists.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, December 3, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/iinternet-back-in-syria-so-is-malware. 
Galperin, Eva, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “Trojan Hidden in Fake Revolutionary Documents Targets 
Syrian Activists.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 31, 2012. 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/trojan-hidden-fake-revolutionary-documents-targets-
syrian-activists. 
Galperin, Eva, Morgan Marquis-Boire and John Scott-Railton. “Quantum of Surveillance: Familiar 
Actors and Possible False Flags in Syrian Malware Campaigns.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
2013. https://www.eff.org/nl/document/quantum-surveillance-familiar-actors-and-possible-false-
flags-syrian-malware-campaigns. 
72 
 
Gartzke, Erik. “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth.” 
International Security, 38, no. 2 (2013): 41-73. 
Goode, Luke. “Anonymous and the Political Ethos of Hacktivism.” Popular Communication, 13, no. 1 
(2015): 74-86. 
Goodin, Dan. “Hacked AP Twitter feed reporting fake White House attack rocks markets.” Ars 
Technica, April 23, 2013. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/04/hacked-ap-
twitter-feed-rocks-market-after-sending-false-news-flash/. 
Goodin, Dan. “Twitter and New York Times Clash with hackers for control of their sites.” Ars 
Technica, August 28, 2013. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/08/twitter-and-
new-york-times-clash-with-hackers-for-control-of-their-sites/. 
Ilascu, Ionut. “Reuters’ Twitter Account Hijacked by Syrian Electronic Army.” Softpedia, July 30, 
2013. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Reuters-Twitter-Account-Hijacked-by-Syrian-Electronic-
Army-371890.shtml. 
IntelCrawler. “Syrian Electronic Army – Hacktivision to Cyber Espionage?” IntelCrawler, 2014. 
http://intelcrawler.com/ic-sea.pdf. 
Kaspersky Lab. “Kaspersky Lab warns users of the dangers posed by Syrian malware.” August 18, 
2014. https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2014_kaspersky-lab-warns-users-of-the-
dangers-posed-by-syrian-malware. 
Kastrenakes, Jacob. “Syrian Electronic Army alleges stealing ‘millions’ of Phone numbers from chat 
app Tango.” The Verge, July 22, 2013. https://www.theverge.com/2013/7/22/4545838/sea-giving-
hacked-tango-database-government. 
Katerji, Oz. “The Syrian Electronic Army Are at Cyber War with Anonymous.” Vice, April 4, 2013. 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/gqn4w9/the-syrian-electronic-army-hacked-the-bbc. 
Kello, Lucas. “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft.” International 
Security, 38, no. 2 (2013): 7-40. 
Kenney, Michael. “Cyber-Terrorism in a Post-Stuxnet World.” Orbis, 59, no. 1 (2015): 111-128. 
Khandelwal, Swati. “37-Year-Old ‘Syrian Electronic Army’ Hacker Pleads Guilty in US court.” The 
Hacker News, September 29, 2016. https://thehackernews.com/2016/09/syrian-electronic-army-
hacker.html. 
Kovacs, Eduard. “Syrian Electronic Army “Hacks” Website of RSA Conference.” Softpedia, April 29, 
2014. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-Electronic-Army-Defaces-Website-of-RSA-
Conference-439866.shtml. 
Kumar, Mohit. “Syrian Hackers Deface AnonPlus – Anonymous Social Network.” The Hacker News, 
August 8, 2011. https://thehackernews.com/2011/08/syrian-hackers-deface-anonplus.html. 
Kumar, Mohit. “Syrian Ministry of Defense hacked by Anonymous Hackers.” The Hacker News, 
August 7, 2011. https://thehackernews.com/2011/08/syrian-ministry-of-defense-hacked-by.html. 
73 
 
Lister, Charles. The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
2015. 
Lundgren, Magnus. “Mediation in Syria: Initiatives, Strategies, and Obstacles, 2011 – 2016.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 37, no. 2 (2016): 273-288. 
Maness, Ryan C., and Brandon Valeriano. “The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Relations.” 
Armed Forces & Society, 42, no. 2 (2016): 301-323. 
Marquis-Boire, Morgan. “Iranian anti-censorship software ‘Simurgh’ circulated with malicious 
backdoor (Updated).” The Citizens Lab, May 25, 2012, last updated May 30, 2012. 
https://citizenlab.ca/2012/05/iranian-anti-censorship-software-simurgh-circulated-with-malicious-
backdoor-2. 
Masi, Alessandria. “Syrian Electronic Army Hacks International Business Times Website.” 
International Business Times, December 17, 2014. http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-electronic-
army-hacks-international-business-times-website-1762097. 
Mattise, Nathan. “Syrian Electronic Army targets Reuters again-but ad network provided the leak.” 
Ars Technica, June 23, 2014. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/syrian-
electronic-army-targets-reuters-again-but-ad-network-provided-the-leak/. 
Matyszczyk, Chris. “Microsoft’s Twitter account: Don’t use our e-mail.” CNet, January 11, 2014. 
https://www.cnet.com/news/microsofts-twitter-account-dont-use-our-e-mail/. 
McGraw, Gary. “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In).” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 36, no. 1 (2013): 109-119. 
Merchant, Brian. “Is This the Leader of the Syrian Electronic Army?” Vice, August 29, 2013. 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/4xxjp9/is-this-19-year-old-the-leader-of-the-syrian-
electronic-army. 
Mihalcik, Carrie. “Sky’s Android apps, Twitter account hacked.” CNet, May 26, 2013. 
https://www.cnet.com/news/skys-android-apps-twitter-account-hacked/. 
Musil, Steven. “Reuters Twitter account hijacked, fake tweets sent.” CNet, August 5, 2012. 
https://www.cnet.com/news/reuters-twitter-account-hijacked-fake-tweets-sent/. 
OpenNet Initiative. “Syrian Electronic Army: Disruptive Attacks and Hyped Targets.” OpenNet 
Initiative, accessed 24 June 2018. https://opennet.net/syrian-electronic-army-disruptive-attacks-
and-hyped-targets. 
Osborne, Charlie. “Guardian Twitter accounts compromised, SEA takes credit.” ZDNet, April 29, 
2013. http://www.zdnet.com/article/guardian-twitter-accounts-compromised-sea-takes-credit/. 
Passeri, Paulo. “AnonPlus Hacked (Again) by Syrian Group.” Hackmageddon, July 24, 2011. 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2011/07/24/anonplus-hacked-again-by-syrian-group/. 
Passeri, Paulo. “AnonPlus Hacked Again By Syrian Hackers.” Hackmageddon, August 9, 2011. 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2011/08/09/anonplus-hacked-again-by-syrian-hackers/. 
74 
 
Pastebin. “Anonymous Operation Syria – Press Release.” July 8, 2012. https://pastebin.com/snj63PtF. 
Pastebin. “Untitled.” June 3, 2011. https://pastebin.com/Kww0QN3C. 
Phneah, Ellyne. “Anonymous, Hacktivists helped Wikileaks with ‘Syrian Files.’” ZDNet, July 9, 2012. 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/anonymous-hacktivists-helped-wikileaks-with-syrian-files/. 
Poulsen, Kevin. “In Syria’s Civil War, Facebook Has Become A Battlefield.” Wired, December 23, 
2013. https://www.wired.com/2013/12/syria-report/. 
Protalinski, Emil. “Al Arabiya Facebook Page Hacked, fake Syria news posted.” ZDNet, March 26, 
2012. https://www.zdnet.com/article/al-arabiya-facebook-page-hacked-fake-syria-news-posted/. 
Racicot, Jonathan. “The Syrian Civil Conflict in the Cyber Environment.” ResearchGate, 2015. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281257586_The_Syrian_Civil_Conflict_in_the_Cyber_
Environment. 
Regalado, Daniel, Nart Villeneuve, and John Scott-Railton. “Behind the Syrian Conflict’s Digital 
Front Lines.” FireEye, 2015. https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-
www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-behind-the-syria-conflict.pdf. 
Reporters Without Borders. “Syria.” Reporters Without Borders. March 11, 2011, last updated on 
January 20, 2016. https://rsf.org/en/news/syria-1. 
Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 35, no. 1 (2012): 5-32. 
RSA Conference. “Syrian Electronic Army: Their Methods and Your Responses.” filmed February 28, 
2014 at Moscone Center, San Francisco, video, 24:27. 
https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us14/agenda/sessions/1361/syrian-electronic-army-their-
methods-and-your. 
RT. “Reuters hacked: Bogus blog posts claim Syrian rebel exodus (CACHED COPIES).” RT, August 
5, 2012. https://www.rt.com/news/reuters-hack-fake-posts-884/. 
Samuel, Henry. “Le Monde hacked: ‘Je ne suis pas Charlie’ writes Syrian Electronic Army.” The 
Telegraph, January 21, 2015. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11359732/Le-Monde-hacked-Je-ne-
suis-pas-Charlie-writes-Syrian-Electronic-Army.html. 
Schmidt, Nikola. “Neither Conventional War, Nor a Cyber War, But a Long-lasting and Silent Hybrid 
War.” Defence & Strategy, 2 (2014): 73-86. 
Scott-Railton, John, and Morgan Marquis-Boire. “A Call to Harm: New Malware Attacks Target the 
Syrian Opposition.” The Citizen Lab, June 21, 2013. https://citizenlab.ca/2013/06/a-call-to-harm/. 
Scott-Railton, John, and Seth Hardy. “Malware Attack Targeting Syrian ISIS Critics.” The Citizen 
Lab, December 18, 2014. https://citizenlab.ca/2014/12/malware-attack-targeting-syrian-isis-
critics/. 
75 
 
Scott-Railton, John, Bahr Abdul Razzak, Adam Hulcoop, Matt Brooks, and Katie Kleemola. “Group 
5: Syria and the Iranian Connection.” The Citizen Lab, August 2, 2016. 
https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/group5-syria/. 
Scott-Railton, John. “Maliciously Repackaged Psiphon Found.” The Citizen Lab, March 13, 2014. 
https://citizenlab.ca/2014/03/maliciously-repackaged-psiphon/. 
Segal, Adam. The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the 
Digital Age. New York: PublicAffairs, 2016. 
Serpent’s Embrace. “Operation Syria: To the people of Syria, & all the other free citizens of the 
world.” Anonymous: Operation Syria. March 27, 2011. 
https://serpentsembrace.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/anonymous-operation-syria/. 
Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack. “From Subjects to Citizens? Civil Society and the Internet in Syria.” 
Middle East Critique, 20, no. 2 (2011): 127-138. 
Shoichet, Catherine E. “Some CNN social media accounts hacked.” CNN, January 24, 2014. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/tech/cnn-accounts-hacked/. 
Sigal, Ivan. “Syria’s war may be the most documented ever. And yet, we know so little.” PRI, 
December 19, 2016. https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-19/syrias-war-may-be-most-
documented-ever-and-yet-we-know-so-little. 
Smeets, Max. “A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 41, no. 1 (2018): 6-32. 
Sterling, Bruce. “Syrian Electronic Army Invades University of California Los Angeles.” Wired, July 
6, 2011. https://www.wired.com/2011/07/syrian-electronic-army-invades-university-of-california-
los-angeles/. 
Syrian malware. “Syrian Malware | Samples from the conflict in Syria.” Accessed July 9, 2018. 
https://syrianmalware.com/. 
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Phishing.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed July 10, 
2018. https://www.britannica.com/technology/phishing. 
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Syrian Civil War: Syrian History.” Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. Accessed 17 June, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-
War/Introduction. 
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Trojan.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed July 10, 
2018. https://www.britannica.com/technology/trojan-computing. 
TheHairyHeart. “Interview with The Syrian Electronic Army.” Filmed 2013, broadcasted by al-
Mayadeen. Video, 49:48. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OR6v_cd_XhY. 
Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness. “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict Between Rival 
Antagonists, 2001-2011.” Journal of Peace Research, 51, no. 3 (2014): 347-360. 
76 
 
Waqas. “Outbrain hacked: CNN, Time and Washington Post redirect users to Syrian Electronic Army 
site.” HackRead, August 17, 2013. https://www.hackread.com/syrial-electronic-army-hacks-
outbrain-cnn-time-wp-compromised/. 
Waqas. “TrueCaller Phone Directory Hacked, Database with Millions of Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin 
& Gmail accounts dumped.” HackRead, July 17, 2013. https://www.hackread.com/truecaller-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/. 
Waqas. “United Nations Information Center Jakarta Websites Hacked by Dr.SHA6H.” HackRead, 
May 24, 2013. https://www.hackread.com/united-nations-information-center-jakarta-websites-
hacked-by-dr-sha6h/. 
Waqas. “Website of Uzbek Embassy in Kuwait hacked by anti-Assad Hacker.” HackRead, May 24, 
2015. https://www.hackread.com/anti-assad-hacker-hacks-uzbek-embassy/. 
Yeung, Ken. “Skype’s Twitter, Facebook, and blog hacked by Syrian Electronic Army demanding an 
end to spying.” The Next Web, January 1, 2014. 
https://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2014/01/01/skypes-twitter-account-blog-get-hacked-sea-
demanding-end-spying/#!t7toD. 
 
  
77 
 
Appendix I: List of cyber attacks related to the Syrian civil war 
 
Phase 1 (15 March 2011 – 19 April 2012): 
Date Attacker Target Category Source 
3 Jun 2011 Anonymous Syria  https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386393,00.as
p 
6 Jul 2011 SEA University of 
California 
Universities https://www.wired.com/2011/07/syrian-electronic-
army-invades-university-of-california-los-angeles/ 
22 Jul 2011 Telecomix Syria  http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Syrian-
internet-censors-log-files-released-1355276.html 
24 Jul 2011 SEA Anonymous  https://www.hackmageddon.com/2011/07/24/anonplus-
hacked-again-by-syrian-group/ 
7 Aug 2011 Anonymous Syria  https://thehackernews.com/2011/08/syrian-ministry-of-
defense-hacked-by.html 
8 Aug 2011 SEA Anonymous  https://www.hackmageddon.com/2011/08/09/anonplus-
hacked-again-by-syrian-hackers/ 
25 Sep 2011 Anonymous; 
RevoluSec 
Syria  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/2
01192692416534215.html 
26 Sep2011 SEA Harvard 
University 
Universities https://thehackernews.com/2011/09/harvard-university-
website-hacked-by.html 
29 Jan 2012 SEA Al-Jazeera Media https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/pro-
government-hactivists-deface-al-jazeera-coverage-of-
syrian-violence/ 
3 Feb2012 Saudi individual Syria  https://thehackernews.com/2012/02/syrian-presidents-
e-mail-hacked-by.html 
5 Feb2012 Anonymous Syria  https://www.haaretz.com/1.5182336 
9 Feb 2012 TeaMp0isoN Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/TeaMp0isoN-Leaks-
Syrian-Military-Bank-Accounts-251637.shtml 
14 Mar 2012 Anonymous; 
AntiSec 
Syria  https://www.zdnet.com/article/anonymous-hacktivists-
helped-wikileaks-with-syrian-files/ 
24 Mar 2012 SEA Al-Arabiya Media https://www.zdnet.com/article/al-arabiya-facebook-
page-hacked-fake-syria-news-posted/ 
 
Phase 2 (19 April 2012 – 1 January 2014):  
Date Attacker Target Category Source 
24 Apr 2012 SEA Al-Arabiya Media http://www.ehackingnews.com/2012/04/al-
arabiyas-twitter-facebook-accounts.html 
26 Apr 2012 SEA LinkedIn Communication https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/s
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services yrian-electronic-army-hacks-linkedin-blog 
17 Jul 2012 SEA Anonymous  https://www.security.nl/posting/37255/Gege
vens+Anonymous+Nederland+gelekt 
3 Aug 2012 SEA Reuters Media https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/arch
ive/2012/08/reuters-blogs-hacked-fake-
story-about-syrian-rebels/325064/ 
5 Aug 2012 SEA Reuters Media https://www.cnet.com/news/reuters-twitter-
account-hijacked-fake-tweets-sent/ 
4 Sep 2012 Al-Rashedon Al-Jazeera Media https://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Internet_hacker
s_attack_Al-
Jazeera_website,_condemn_news_service%
27s_Syrian_civil_war_coverage 
10 Sep 2012 SEA Al-Jazeera Media http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
19544290 
26 Nov 2012 Anonymous Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Anonymous
-Hackers-Leak-1GB-of-Emails-from-Syrian-
Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs-310193.shtml 
3 Dec 2012 Dr. SHA6H Philippines Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/5-philippines-
municipality-websites-defaced-by-dr-sha6h/ 
18 Dec 2012 Unknown Al-Qaida Other https://wtop.com/j-j-green-
national/2012/12/al-qaida-hit-by-cyber-
attack/ 
5 Jan 2013 SEA MasterCard Commercial http://www.ehackingnews.com/2013/01/mas
tercard-blog-hacked.html 
8 Jan 2013 SEA Saudi Arabia Other state actors http://hilf-ol-fozoul.blogspot.nl/2013/01/all-
saudi-arabian-ministry-of-defense.html 
12 Jan 2013 Dr. SHA6H Philippines Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/philippine-govts-
child-adoption-anti-child-stag-film-poverty-
reduction-sites-defaced/ 
2 Feb 2013 TeaM KuWaiT 
HaCkErS 
Iraq  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-
protests/amid-iraqi-protests-hackers-hit-
malikis-website-idUSBRE91104C20130202 
3 Feb 2013 SEA Haaretz Media https://www.hackread.com/israeli-news-site-
haaretz-hacked-emails-passwords-leaked-
by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
7 Feb 2013 SEA Sky News Arabia Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/Sky-News-
Arabia-Twitter-and-Facebook-Accounts-
Hacked-by-Syrian-Electronic-Army-
327540.shtml 
23 Feb 2013 TeaM KuWaiT 
HaCkErS 
Lebanon Other state Actors https://www.hackread.com/lebanon-
parliament-website-hacked-by-team-
kuwaiti-hackers/ 
26 Feb 2013 SEA AFP Media https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/26
/afps-twitter-photo-account-
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hacked_n_2767052.html 
1 Mar 2013 SEA The Qatar 
Foundation 
Non-profit https://www.hackread.com/qatar-
foundations-twitter-and-facebook-accounts-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
5 mar 2013 SEA France 24 Arabia Media https://www.hackread.com/france-24-arabia-
and-france-24-observers-twitter-accounts-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
15 Mar 2013 SEA Deutche Welle 
Arabic 
Media https://www.hackread.com/german-
broadcaster-deutsche-welles-dw-twitter-
account-hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
17 Mar 2013 SEA Human Rights 
Watch 
Non-profit https://www.hackread.com/human-rights-
watch-official-website-twitter-accounts-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
17 Mar 2013 Syrian Cyber 
Eagles 
Privacy Corps Non-profit https://www.hackread.com/privacy-corps-
website-breached-1847-client-accounts-
with-clear-text-passwords-leaked-by-syrian-
cyber-eagles/ 
20 Mar 2013 Dr. SHA4H Several websites  https://www.hackread.com/official-websites-
of-mitsubishi-and-hyundai-motors-
venezuela-defaced-by-dr-sha6h/ 
21 Mar 2013 SEA BBC Arabic Media https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/2
1/bbc-weather-twitter-account-hackedsyrian-
electronic-army/ 
16 Apr 2013 Dr. SHA6H Iran  https://www.hackread.com/iranian-embassy-
in-singapore-website-hacked-defaced-by-dr-
sha6h/ 
16 Apr 2013 SEA NPR Media https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/04/1
6/syrian-electronic-army-npr/ 
20 Apr 2013 SEA CBS News Media https://www.cnet.com/news/hackers-send-
bogus-tweets-from-60-minutes-account/ 
23 Apr 2013 SEA AP Media https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/04/hacked-ap-twitter-feed-
rocks-market-after-sending-false-news-flash/ 
27 Apr 2013 Iraqi-Top Iraq  https://www.hackread.com/iraqs-ministry-
of-oil-website-hacked-defaced-by-iraqi-top-
hacker/ 
29 Apr 2013 SEA The Guardian Media http://www.zdnet.com/article/guardian-
twitter-accounts-compromised-sea-takes-
credit/ 
6 May 2013 SEA E! Online Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/E-Online-
Twitter-Account-Hacked-Fake-Justin-
Bieber-News-Posted-351015.shtml 
8 May 2013 SEA The Onion Media http://theonion.github.io/blog/2013/05/08/ho
w-the-syrian-electronic-army-hacked-the-
onion/ 
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20 May 2013 SEA The Telegraph Media https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/telegraph-
hacked-sea-syrian-electronic-army/ 
24 May 2013 Dr. SHA6H United Nations Non-profit https://www.hackread.com/united-nations-
information-center-jakarta-websites-hacked-
by-dr-sha6h/ 
25 May 2013 SEA ITV News Media https://www.grahamcluley.com/itv-london-
hacked-on-twitter-syrian-electronic-army-
strikes-again/ 
26 May 2013 SEA SKY Media https://www.cnet.com/news/skys-android-
apps-twitter-account-hacked/ 
1 Jun 2013 Group Hp-Hack Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Saudi-
Arabian-Hackers-Breach-Syrian-Ministry-
of-Legal-Affairs-Website-357738.shtml 
5 Jun 2013 Anonymous; 
SEA 
Turkey  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-and-Anonymous-Turkey-
Target-Turkish-Prime-Minister-s-Site-
358474.shtml 
5 Jun 2013 SEA Turkey  https://news.softpedia.com/news/Four-
Turkish-Government-Sites-Defaced-by-
Syrian-Hacker-for-OpTurkey-358288.shtml 
5 Jun 2013 Security Dr@gon Turkey  https://news.softpedia.com/news/Four-
Turkish-Government-Sites-Defaced-by-
Syrian-Hacker-for-OpTurkey-358288.shtml 
17 Jun 2013 SEA Truecaller Communication 
services 
https://www.hackread.com/truecaller-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
20 Jul 2013 
 
SEA Tango Communication 
services 
https://www.theverge.com/2013/7/22/45458
38/sea-giving-hacked-tango-database-
government 
20 Jul 2013 SEA Reuters Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/Reuters-
Twitter-Account-Hijacked-by-Syrian-
Electronic-Army-371890.shtml 
23 Jul 2013 SEA DailyDot Media https://thehackernews.com/2013/07/daily-
dot-news-portal-hacked-by-syrian.html 
23 Jul 2013 SEA Viber Communication 
services 
https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/07/vibers-online-help-
desk-sacked-by-pro-syrian-hackers/ 
28 Jul 2013 Dr. SHA6H Several websites  https://www.hackread.com/venezuela-
military-domains-hacked-drsha6h-
colombianh/ 
29 Jul 2013 SEA USA  http://www.ehackingnews.com/2013/07/whit
ehouse-email-hacked.html 
1 Aug 2013 Dr. SHA6H Several websites  https://www.hackread.com/fiat-dodge-
australia-hacked-drsha6h/ 
7 Aug 2013 SEA Channel 4 Media http://www.ehackingnews.com/2013/08/excl
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usive-british-channel-4-blog-hacked.html 
14 Aug 2013 SEA New York Post Media http://www.ehackingnews.com/2013/08/soci
alflow-hacked-new-york-post.html 
17 Aug 2013 SEA CNN; 
Time; 
Washington Post 
Media https://www.hackread.com/syrial-electronic-
army-hacks-outbrain-cnn-time-wp-
compromised/ 
22 Aug 2013 SEA Sharethis Communication 
services 
https://www.hackread.com/syrian-
electronic-army-hacks-sharethis-godaddy-
acc-and-redirects/ 
24 Aug 2013 Turkish 
individuals 
Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Turkish-
Hackers-Target-Syrian-Websites-in-Protest-
Against-the-Use-of-Chemical-Weapons-
377986.shtml 
27 Aug 2013 TheJester Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Website-of-
Atomic-Energy-Commission-of-Syria-
Disrupted-by-The-Jester-378369.shtml 
28 Aug 2013 SEA Twitter; 
New York Times; 
Huffington Post 
Media https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/08/twitter-and-new-york-
times-clash-with-hackers-for-control-of-
their-sites/ 
31 Aug 2013 Anonymous SEA  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/09/02/ano
n_slurps_sea_data_launches_leaks/ 
2 Sep 2013 Virus DX Syria  https://www.hackread.com/syriatel-
facebook-page-hacked/ 
3 Sep 2013 SEA USA  https://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/us-
marines-website-hacked-by-syrian-
electronic-army 
10 Sep 2013 SEA FOX Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-Hacks-Large-Number-of-
FOX-Twitter-Accounts-via-HootSuite-
381970.shtml 
13 Sep 2013 Dr. SHA6H Several websites  https://www.hackread.com/avira-un-hacked-
by-dr-sha6h/ 
13 Sep 2013 Unknown Syria  https://www.securityweek.com/syria-state-
news-agency-under-cyber-attack 
30 Sep 2013 SEA GlobalPost Media https://www.hackread.com/globalpost-site-
twitter-hacked-sea/ 
4 Oct 2013 Dr. SHA6H Several websites  https://www.hackread.com/dr-sha6h-hacks-
avast-av-serbia-syria/ 
9 Oct 2013 Dr. SHA6H USA  https://www.hackread.com/mansfield-city-
site-hacked-for-syria/ 
19 Oct 2013 SEA Qatar Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/sea-hacks-qatar-
domain-registrar/ 
23 Oct 2013 Anonymous Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/OpSyria-
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Anonymous-Hacks-Syria-s-Higher-
Commission-for-Scientific-Research-
393895.shtml 
28 Oct 2013 SEA USA  http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/28/technolog
y/barack-obama-twitter-hack/index.html 
1 Nov 2013 RGB Homs; 
Silent Injector; 
Syrian Hexor 
Syria  http://news.softpedia.com/news/Three-
Government-Websites-from-Syria-Hacked-
and-Defaced-396126.shtml 
8 Nov 2013 SEA Vice Media https://www.cyberwarnews.info/2013/11/10/
vice-hacked-by-syria-electronic-army/ 
17 Nov 2013 Bangladesh Grey 
Hat Hackers 
Syria  https://www.hackread.com/syrian-ministry-
of-electricity-website-hacked-by-bghh/ 
1 Dec 2013 SEA Time Media https://www.rt.com/news/syrian-electronic-
army-time-500/ 
12 Dec 2013 SEA Matthew 
VanDyke 
Other http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-Targets-American-
Filmmaker-Matt-VanDyke-408399.shtml 
28 Dec 2013 Dr. SHA6H United Nations Non-profit https://www.hackread.com/syrain-hacker-
hacks-unpf-for-syria/ 
 
Phase 3 (1 January 2014 – 30 September 2015):  
Date Attacker Target Category Source 
1 Jan 2014 SEA 
 
Skype Communication 
services 
https://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2014/01/0
1/skypes-twitter-account-blog-get-hacked-
sea-demanding-end-spying/#!t7toD 
11 Jan 2014 SEA Microsoft Communication 
services 
https://www.cnet.com/news/microsofts-
twitter-account-dont-use-our-e-mail/ 
15 Jan 2014 TurkGuvenligi SEA  https://www.grahamcluley.com/syrian-
electronic-army-website-hacked/ 
15 Jan 2014 SEA Saudi Arabia Other state actors http://news.softpedia.com/news/16-Saudi-
Arabian-Government-Websites-Hacked-by-
Syrian-Electronic-Army-417751.shtml 
23 Jan 2014 SEA CNN Media https://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/tech/cnn-
accounts-hacked/ 
1 Feb 2014 SEA eBay Commercial https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/02/joining-microsoft-
ebays-sensitive-e-mail-is-intercepted-by-
hackers/ 
14 Feb 2014 SEA Forbes Media https://www.cnet.com/news/syrian-
electronic-army-hacks-forbes-steals-user-
data/ 
19 Feb 2014 SEA FC Barcelona Other https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/footbal
l/european/barcelona-twitter-account-
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hacked-by-supports-of-syrian-president-
bashar-al-assad-9138237.html 
17 Mar 2014 SEA Syrian National 
Coalition 
Non-profit http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-Hacks-Website-of-Syrian-
National-Coalition-432473.shtml 
6 Apr 2014 European Cyber 
Army 
Syria  http://www.ehackingnews.com/2014/04/euro
pean-cyber-army-leaks-60k.html 
29 Apr 2014 SEA RSA Conference Non-profit http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-Defaces-Website-of-RSA-
Conference-439866.shtml 
7 May 2014 SEA Wall Street 
Journal 
Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/Syrian-
Electronic-Army-Hijacks-WSJ-Twitter-
Accounts-440924.shtml 
23 Jun 2014 SEA Reuters Media https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/06/syrian-electronic-army-
targets-reuters-again-but-ad-network-
provided-the-leak/ 
28 Jun 2014 SEA Israel Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/syrian-
electronic-army-hacks-israeli-defense-
forces-blog/ 
4 Jul 2014 SEA Israel Other state actors https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/07/0
4/sea-hacks-israeli-defence-force-twitter-
account-posts-bogus-nuclear-warning/ 
2 Oct 2014 SEA Unicef Non-profit https://www.techworm.net/2014/10/unicef-
twitter-account-hacked.html 
24 Nov 2014 Egyptian Cyber 
Army 
ISIS  https://mashable.com/2014/11/23/egyptian-
cyber-army-isis-baghdadi-
hack/#1mpZqQPyMaq8 
27 Nov 2014 SEA The Independent; 
The Telegraph; 
CNBC; 
Canadian 
Broadcasting 
corp; 
Boston Globe 
Media https://www.cnet.com/news/syrian-
electronic-army-attack-spreads-pop-ups-
across-news-sites/ 
17 Dec 2014 SEA International 
Business Times 
Media http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-electronic-
army-hacks-international-business-times-
website-1762097 
6 Jan 2015 CyberCaliphate Albuquerque 
Journal; 
CBS News; 
FOX 
Media https://www.scmagazine.com/pro-isis-
group-hijacks-twitter-accounts-of-local-
media-outlets/article/535705/ 
11 Jan 2015 Dr. SHA6H Australia Other state actors http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queens
land/bundaberg-library-website-hacked-by-
people-claiming-to-be-from-free-syrian-
people/news-
story/be4097c2bc94ece1f8637ebdd1d7601f 
12 Jan 2015 CyberCaliphate USA  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
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30785232 
15 Jan 2015 Dr. SHA6H USA  https://www.hackread.com/ohio-city-
website-hacked-by-free-syrian-hacker/ 
20 Jan 2015 SEA Le Monde Media https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnew
s/europe/france/11359732/Le-Monde-
hacked-Je-ne-suis-pas-Charlie-writes-
Syrian-Electronic-Army.html 
30 Jan 2015 Team System DZ Women’s 
Resource Centre 
Non-profit https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/womens-
resource-centre-website-hacked-people-
claiming-support-
isis/communications/article/1331684 
9 Feb 2015 Anonymous ISIS  http://www.zdnet.com/article/anonymous-
targets-isis-social-media-recruitment-drives-
in-opisis-campaign/ 
10 Feb 2015 CyberCaliphate Newsweek Media https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cybersecurity-newsweek/cybercaliphate-
hacks-newsweek-twitter-account-threatens-
obama-idUSKBN0LE22Z20150210 
12 Feb 2015 SEA Syrian 
Observatory 
Non-profit http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-
East/2015/Feb-12/287210-observatory-
hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army.ashx 
16 Feb 2015 ISIS Al-Ittihad Media https://www.hackread.com/uae-al-ittihad-
newspaper-website-hacked-by-isis-hackers/ 
9 Mar 2015 ISIS Several websites  http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/34637/ha
cking/fbi-investigating-alleged-isis-
attacks.html 
12 Mar 2015 Anonymous ISIS  https://www.infosecurity-
magazine.com/news/proisis-facebook-site-
taken-offline/ 
21 Mar 2015 Team System DZ USA  https://www.hackread.com/pro-isis-hackers-
hacks-richland-county-sheriffs-dept-website/ 
25 Mar 2015 CyberCaliphate; 
Team System DZ; 
FallaGa Team; 
Global Islamic 
Caliphate 
Russia; 
Several websites 
 http://news.softpedia.com/news/Cyber-
Caliphate-Hackers-Deface-600-Russian-
Internet-Resources-476718.shtml 
31 Mar 2015 SEA Several web 
hosting services 
Communication 
services 
https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syrian-electronic-
army-hacks-hosting-services-supporting-
terrorist-websites-1494393 
5 Apr 2015 Anonymous ISIS  https://www.hackread.com/anonymous-
exposes-list-of-sites-supporting-isis-and-
hosting-companies-protecting-them/ 
12 Apr 2015 Team System DZ Australia Other state actors http://www.zdnet.com/article/hobart-airport-
website-down-after-pro-is-hack/ 
14 Apr 2015 Team System DZ University of 
Toronto 
Universities https://www.hackread.com/toronto-
university-website-hacked-isis-hackers/ 
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14 May 2015 SEA Washington Post Media https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/05/14/the-syrian-electronic-
army-just-hacked-the-washington-post-
again/?utm_term=.79212ef5e7f5 
24 May 2015 Dr. SHA6H Uzbekistan Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/anti-assad-
hacker-hacks-uzbek-embassy/ 
8 Jun 2015 SEA USA  https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2015/06/us-army-website-
defaced-by-syrian-electronic-army/ 
 
Phase 4 (30 September 2015 – 22 December 2016):  
Date Attacker Target Category Source 
17 Nov 2015 Anonymous ISIS  https://www.scmagazine.com/anonymous-
shutters-55k-pro-isis-twitter-
accounts/article/533053/ 
18 Nov 2015 Anonymous ISIS  http://www.vocativ.com/news/251771/anony
mous-hits-main-isis-forum/ 
25 Nov 2015 GhostSec ISIS  https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hackers-replace-
dark-web-isis-propaganda-site-advert-
prozac-1530385 
28 Nov 2015 Team System DZ USA  https://www.hackread.com/isis-hacks-
richland-county-veterans-services-site/ 
14 Dec 2015 CyberCaliphate USA; 
France 
Other state actors https://www.hackread.com/isis-military-
data-against-anonymous-isis-trolling-day/ 
25 Dec 2015 Turk Hack Team Russia; 
Iran 
 https://www.hackread.com/turk-hack-team-
ddos-attacks-on-iran-russian/ 
18 Jan 2016 Islamic State 
Hacker 
Tsinghua 
University 
Universities http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1902268/islamic-state-
hackers-attack-top-tier-chinese 
31 Jan 2016 CyberCaliphate Solar UK Commercial http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
sussex-35681783 
29 Feb 2016 USA ISIS  http://www.zdnet.com/article/us-military-
launches-first-cyberattack-against-isis-
targets/ 
5 Mar 2016 CyberCaliphate USA  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3478237/ISIS-hackers-threaten-55-New-
Jersey-police-officers-releasing-home-
addresses-phone-numbers-working-
locations.html 
5 Mar 2016 ISIS South Korea Other state actors https://www.databreaches.net/south-korean-
police-investigating-alleged-isis-hacking/ 
17 Apr 2016 Team System DZ USA  https://www.hackread.com/richland-county-
website-sheriffs-dept-hacked/ 
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19 Apr 2016 Team System DZ Several websites  http://news.softpedia.com/news/pro-isis-
group-defaces-88-websites-in-three-day-
rampage-503153.shtml 
25 Apr 2016 United Cyber 
Caliphate 
Michigan church Other http://news.softpedia.com/news/pro-isis-
group-defaces-88-websites-in-three-day-
rampage-503153.shtml 
29 Apr 2016 United Cyber 
Caliphate 
USA  http://www.ibtimes.sg/isis-new-york-hit-list-
hackers-post-details-3600-residents-online-
1253 
2 May 2016 Islamic State 
Hacking Division 
USA  https://arynews.tv/en/isis-hackers-ps-
military-men/ 
9 Jun 2016 United Cyber 
Caliphate 
USA  https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-longest-ever-
kill-list-targeting-over-8000-people-
released-by-united-cyber-caliphate-1564450 
10 Jun 2016 United Cyber 
Caliphate 
USA  http://news.softpedia.com/news/isis-hackers-
leak-details-from-arkansas-library-
association-505074.shtml 
11 Jun 2016 Anonymous ISIS  http://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-
hacker-hijacks-isis-twitter-accounts-and-
floods-them-with-adult-images-
505136.shtml 
11 Jun 2016 Anonymous ISIS  http://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-
hacker-hijacks-isis-twitter-accounts-and-
floods-them-with-adult-images-
505136.shtml 
13 Jun 2016 MuhmadEmad Dell Commercial http://news.softpedia.com/news/kurdish-
hacker-defaces-dell-websites-505203.shtml 
21 Jul 2016 Unknown ISIS  https://www.hackread.com/ddos-attack-on-
pro-isis-websites/ 
15 Sep 2016 MuslimLeets USA  https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacker-attacks-
american-human-rights-council-62-other-
websites-calling-jihad-1581813 
25 Oct 2016 Syrian Cyber 
Army 
De Standaard; 
Het Nieuwsblad; 
Gazet van 
Antwerpen; 
Het Belang van 
Limburg 
Media http://news.softpedia.com/news/syrian-
cyber-army-claim-ddos-attacks-on-belgian-
media-509623.shtml 
1 Nov 2016 United Cyber 
Caliphate 
Syrian opposition  https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pro-isis-hackers-
claim-shutting-down-telegram-channel-
raqqa-based-syrian-activist-group-1589635 
 
